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TREATING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS




In 524 A.D., the Roman writer Boethius introduced the world to
the concept of the "wheel of fortune" through his widely read and
highly influential book, The Consolation of Philosophy.1 Written immedi-
ately prior to his execution, his work examines the meaning of life
and seeks to identify the supreme source of happiness from among a
catalog of desires, namely: power, fame, riches, honor, pleasure, and
God. Before his exile from Rome, Boethius had been a distinguished
statesman and scholar, and a man recognized for his great probity,
power, and wealth. After being accused of treason, however, Boethius
suffered a sudden reversal of fortune that led to public disrepute, ban-
ishment, and eventually execution.
In his book, Boethius is aided in his quest to discover true happi-
ness by Lady Philosophy, the embodiment of the ultimate achieve-
ments of human reason. During one of his dialogues with Lady
Philosophy, Boethius is consoled in his current misfortune with gentle
rhetoric and soothing melodies of music. Lady Philosophy first re-
minds Boethius of the capricious ways of the Goddess Fortune, who
she describes as a "two-faced . . . blind goddess."2 Lady Philosophy
explains that,
[i]f you hoist your sails in the wind, you will go where the wind
blows you, not where you choose to go; if you put seeds in the
ground, you must be prepared for lean as well as abundant years.
* Samuel H. McCoy, II Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A.,
Dartmouth College, 1951; J.D., Harvard University, 1954.
t B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, 1997;J.D., University of
Virginia, 2001.
1 ANICIUs MANLIUS SEVERINUs BOETHIUS, THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY 21
(Richard Green trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962) (524 A.D.).
2 Id. at 22.
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You have put yourself in Fortune's power; now you must be content
with the ways of your mistress.
3
Lady Philosophy continues,
When Fortune turns her wheel With her proud right hand, she is as
unpredictable as the flooding of the Euripus;4 at one moment she
fiercely tears down mighty kings, at the next the hypocrite exalts the
humbled captive. She neither hears nor cares about the tears of
those in misery; with a hard heart she laughs at the pain she causes.
This is the way she amuses herself; this is the way she shows her
power. She shows her servants the marvel of a man despairing and
happy within a single hour.
5
Lady Philosophy then vicariously stands in the shoes of the God-
dess Fortune and puts forth Fortune's argument justifying the fickle
nature of her ways. She asserts,
Why should I [Fortune] alone be deprived of my rights? The heav-
ens are permitted to grant bright days, then blot them out with dark
nights; the year may decorate the face of the earth with flowers and
fruits, then make it barren again with clouds and frost; the sea is
allowed to invite the sailor with fair weather, then terrify him with
storms. Shall I, then, permit man's insatiable cupidity to tie me
down to a sameness alien to my habits? Here is the source of my
power, the game I always play: I spin my wheel and find pleasure in
raising the low to a high place and lowering those who were on top.
Go up, if you like, but only on condition that you will not feel
abused when my sport requires your fall. Didn't you know about my
habits?
6
It would seem that in the context of the tort system the answer for
many plaintiffs and defendants is no. Persons who have been forced
to put their medical claims and defenses in the hands of judges and
juries are often seen as relying on a system whose adjudication of med-
ical disputes resembles the whimsical ways of the Goddess Fortune. 7
Just as Fortune at times exalts a person-without cause-so too the
tort system allows for undeserving plaintiffs to receive amounts far in
3 Id.
4 Euripus is a narrow strait that separates the island of Euboea from the coast of
Boeotia. It is well known for its irregular tides. Id. at 23 n.1.
5 Id. at 23.
6 Id. at 24.
7 For discussions, pro and con, on jury reliability in medical malpractice cases,
see Jeffrey O'Connell & Christopher Pohl, How Reliable Is Medical Malpractice Law? A
Review of "Medical Malpractice and the American Jury: Confronting the Myths about
Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets and Outrageous Damage Awards" by Neil Vidmar, 12
J.L. & HEALTH 359, 367-69 (1997-1998).
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excess of their actual losses or even recover in spite of unmeritorious
claims. The antithesis holds true as well. Just as Fortune erratically
humbles the mighty to desperation and sorrow, so too the tort system
inexplicably sentences worthy victims to recover less than their fair
share of compensation or nothing at all. Therefore, like the Goddess
Fortune, the tort system appears to demand that those who place their
claims in its hands expect that matters will seemingly be resolved by
lot, not merit. Under the tort system, uncertainty and chance too
often are the rule-not the exception. This viewpoint is shared by two
eminent Harvard scholars-one a physician, the other a lawyer:
Concern for the functioning of the malpractice litigation system led
the State of New York more than 10 years ago to ask us, along with a
group of other Harvard physicians, lawyers, economists, and statisti-
cians, to evaluate that system.
Our Harvard medical practice study found both the medical and
legal systems in urgent need of change. We discovered that in New
York hospitals, more than 100,000 patients were injured annually
because of medical management practices, more than one-quarter
from negligence. (More recently we have found a similar picture in
Utah and Colorado.) Fewer than 7 percent of New York's injured
patients received compensation through the courts, however, and of
those fewer than 20 percent were injured because of negligence. So
the legal system is even more prone to error than the medical sys-
tem it attempts to judge.
In addition, the system is wasteful in economic terms: We found
that the nearly $1 billion paid in New York for malpractice insur-
ance during the year we studied would have been enough to com-
pensate all New York patients injured, whether negligently or not,
for medical costs, lost wages, and home care costs.
And, most important, we found little or no evidence that the cur-
rent malpractice regime improves the quality of subsequent medical




Arbitrary awards have undermined the two goals of the current
tort system as applied to medical malpractice, namely compensation
and deterrence.9 The prime point of adjudicating medical malprac-
8 Howard Hiatt & Paul Weiler, No-Fault Medical Coverage Would Cure Many Ills,
BOSTON GLOE, Nov. 5, 1999, at A27 (referring to HARvARD MED. PRAC. STUDY, PA-
TIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LANyERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PA-
TIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990)).
9 See generally PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991).
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tice claims is to fairly compensate injured persons for the negligence
of physicians and to deter the substandard delivery of medical care.
As over 150 years of adjudicating medical malpractice as torts have
demonstrated, the tort system is incapable of achieving either of these
goals.
As the senior author of this Article has insisted for many decades,
the principal fault of the current tort system is that fault itself is its
bedrock. That is, the tort system operates on the premise that there
can be no recovery by a claimant unless the alleged tortfeasor has
been at fault. 10 In the case of medical injuries, fault consists of negli-
gence. The problem is that many medical injuries cannot be attrib-
uted to any individual's fault, and even if there is fault, it is very often
difficult to prove. This is especially true when one considers the laun-
dry list of potentially negligent defendants that includes, but is not
limited to, physicians, hospitals, equipment manufacturers, and drug
manufacturers-all or none of whom could have been responsible for
a claimant's injuries.' 1 A recent study by the prestigious Institute of
Medicine emphasizes that adverse results from health care commonly
stem from complex, multicausal, systemic interactions, not from any
monocausal individual mistake. This raises a real cultural clash with
typical medical malpractice litigation in which according to an exten-
sive study published by the American Psychological Association, plain-
tiffs' lawyers seek, and then concentrate on, "melodramatic" proof of
an individual actor's error on which to focus jury attention.' 2
In the medical context, any fault, whether multi or mono-causal is
also often extremely difficult to prove due to the complexity of the
litigation arising from the incredibly intricate nature of the human
body. The human body is composed of almost infinitely elaborate in-
terlocking parts that baffle nearly all who study them. Consequently,
it is only natural that triers of fact find it extremely difficult to separate
adverse consequences due to a physician's negligence-if any--from
preexisting conditions that may have further developed during the
course of treatment. Such difficulty is only exacerbated in the course
of a trial since time only permits triers of fact a crash course in
10 E.g.,JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE BLAME GAME (1987); see also G. EDWARD WHITE,
TORT LAW IN AMERICA 164 (1980).
11 See Henson Moore &Jeffrey O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by
Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. RiEv. 1267, 1268 (1984). See generally COmm.
ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INsT. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A
SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter IOM] (sug-
gesting that medical errors are typically the result of a confluence of factors, and
proposing a system of error reduction).
12 NEIL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME 151-69 (2000).
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medicine that usually spans only hours or days, yet covers complex
material that takes several years of study by medical students. Moreo-
ver, the fact that triers are often presented with conflicting and, per-
haps, equally persuasive expert testimony regarding a physician's
purported negligence or lack thereof only makes matters worse. Be-
cause fault is protean, taking on, as it does, different shapes and
meanings, establishing fault has also proven to be an untenable crite-
rion for liability in similarly complex cases, such as product liability
(defining "defect") or even when dealing with relatively simple and
straightforward cases such as auto accidents. 13 But, significantly
enough, more than "twice the proportion (11 percent versus 5 per-
cent) of [medical] malpractice suits go to trial" as compared to "other
types of personal injury suits (such as motor vehicle or product
injuries)."14
Determining damages in personal injury cases, especially for pain
and suffering, is equally, if not more, troublesome.' 5 In most in-
stances of tort loss, relatively accurate markets are available for deter-
mining a plaintiff's actual losses in dollars. For instance, a market is
available for determining the dollar value of a particular motorcycle
damaged in an accident. Likewise, in the case of personal injuries,
markets are available for determining economic damages such as
wage loss. 16 In the case of pain and suffering and other psychic dam-
ages, however, no such markets are available for quantifying loss into a
dollar value. In other words, there are no buyers and sellers of pairl
and suffering; instead, awards are based on highly subjective and dif-
fering notions as to the economic value of intangible injury. Accord-
ing to Professor Mark Geistfeld, this leaves jurors to rely solely on their
"collective enlightened conscience."' 7 The result is that awards for
pain and suffering can vary widely for similar injuries. Two similarly
13 Cf. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BREAKING THE LITIGATION HABIT: ECONOMIC INCEN-
TRVES FOR LEGAL REFORM 10-11 (2000) ("The substantive law declared by the courts is
often complex and.., defies common sense. The imposition of liability is unpredict-
able, leading to doubt as to whether justice is served . . ").
14 Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care Reform, 47
RUTGERS L. REv. 1157, 1163 (1995) (footnote omitted).
15 Jurors sitting on civil cases report that assessing damages is more difficult than
resolving the issue of liability. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering:
A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L.
REv. 773, 783 (1995).
16 See id. at 832-35 (discussing a market approach to the determination of per-
sonal injuries).
17 Id. at 782 (quoting GRAHAM DouTrWArrE, JuRY INSTRUCT7IONS ON DAMAGES IN
TORT ACTIONS § 6-17, at 274 (2d ed. 1988)).
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injured plaintiffs suffering from "equally" severe injuries1 8 may receive
entirely different awards even in the same jurisdiction. Overall, the
numerous problems associated with the assessment of pain and suffer-
ing, and noneconomic damages in general, led Harvard Law Professor
LouisJaffe to remark long ago in a seminal article that the determina-
tion of such damages is an evaluation of the "imponderable" through
means of "arbitrary indeterminateness." 19
In addition to the difficulty and unfairness posed by translating
nonpecuniary losses into pecuniary amounts, three major negative
consequences arise from such an inquiry. First, arbitrary nonmone-
tary awards have the effect of undermining deterrence since risk-creat-
ing actors who perform cost-benefit analyses find it very difficult to
determine whether the costs of prevention are justified in light of the
costs of liability (both monetary and nonmonetary) that may arise in
the absence of such precautions. 20 Second, unpredictability of non-
monetary damages also makes the prospect of the parties agreeing to
a settlement price much more elusive.2 ' Lastly, arbitrary nonmone-
tary awards have the further effect of increasing the price of liability
insurance and, even on occasion, threatening the complete with-
drawal of insurance coverage for some areas of medical treatment.2 2
As Professor Kenneth Abraham puts it in the similar context of prod-
uct liability:
Ex ante, the prospect of a runaway tort award, even worse of a multi-
plicity of such awards stemming from a single decision ... can gen-
erate a level of risk aversion among potential defendants and their
insurers that is far more costly and economically disruptive than the
same tort expenditures made in a more rational and predictable
fashion.
23
With all the difficulties of determining fault and nonpecuniary
losses, the tort system represents two unfortunate extremes. At one
end, there is an abundance of "false positives," i.e., outcomes when
defendants are held responsible for a plaintiff's losses when they
18 Notice that there is no objective measurement for determining the severity of a
plaintiff's pain and suffering. SeeJeffrey O'Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding
Early Offers as a Simple, if Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858, 862-63
(1999).
19 Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring 1953, at 219, 224-25.
20 See Geistfeld, supra note 15, at 786-87.
21 See Weiler, supra note 14, at 1179.
22 See Geistfeld, supra note 15, at 788.
23 Id. (quoting Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal In-
jury: Further Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333, 339 (1993)).
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should not be.24 At the opposite end, there are countless cases of
"false negatives," i.e., outcomes when defendants are not held respon-
sible for plaintiffs' injuries when they should be.25 Between these ex-
tremes are also the problems of fraud and other chicane. The impact
of fraud and corruption is threefold. First, they can lead to occur-
rences of false positives, the aggregating effects of which can cripple
the tort system. Second, fraud and other corruption can also result in
the overcompensation of a plaintiff. For example, since awards for
pain and suffering are often roughly calculated as a multiple of medi-
cal expenses, the incentive to incur unnecessary medical services (al-
ready covered by the claimant's own health insurance) is rampant. In
this second situation, even though a defendant should be held liable
for a plaintiffs injuries, the defendant-and society-is made to pay
more than is necessary to compensate fully the plaintiff. Insurers and
consumers are the bearers of those extra costs, in the form of higher
premiums and other health care expenses. Finally, the prospect of
false negatives encourages defendants to unfairly resist, reduce, and
delay payment of deserving claims.
The adjudication of complicated disputes by non-expert judges
and juries can add to the problems of the tort system. Triers of fact
consist of ordinary laity who can be overwhelmed by complicated fact
patterns, conflicting expert testimony and sympathy, and emotion.
When such is the case, juries for example, often decide suits-several
years after the incident in question-"by the spirit of the law and not
by its letter."26 This generalization is buttressed when one considers
the complicated, long-winded nature of jury instructions, often
framed in legalese incomprehensible to jurors, formulated more to
satisfy appellate courts rather than enlighten jurors.27 The result is
24 SeeJeffrey O'Connell, Two-Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault & Quasi-Criminal Liabil-
ity, 27 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 871, 871 (1992). It is estimated that 25,000 to 30,000
medical tort suits filed each year are invalid. Weiler, supra note 14, at 1165.
25 See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 871. It is estimated that each year perhaps
75,000 potentially valid claims are not filed or do not lead to awards. Weiler, supra
note 14, at 1165.
26 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8 (1966).
27 See generally Robert P. Charrow & Vedar R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306
(1979) (proposing a methodology for measuring comprehensibility of legal language,
in particular, jury instructions); Charles T..McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Ques-
tions in Civil-hCases, 2 F.R.D. 176, 177 (1941) (calling for reform of juries and jury
instructions).
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that, in Jerome Frank's telling phrase, many jury findings are an exer-
cise in 'Juriesprudence" not 'jurisprudence."
28
Turning to the substance of this Article, Part I of this Article sum-
marizes the duty of care standard applied to physicians. Part II sum-
marizes those standards as applied much more leniently to corporate
officers and directors under the business judgment rule. Part III con-
tains systematic responses to the seven arguments most often pro-
posed as to why a difference in legal liability attaches for physicians as
opposed to corporate officers and directors. Part IV summarizes an
early offers plan and explains the improvements it makes over the
existing tort system. Finally, the Appendix focuses on the "tools" of
the early offers approach and examines whether jurors will be able to
distinguish between the early offers plan and the ordinary tort system.
Before presenting the following proposal for applying a variation
of the business judgment rule to medical malpractice law, let it be said
that in doing so we undertake a very extensive description and com-
parison of both medical malpractice law and the business judgment
rule. All these legal niceties are presented in deference to the maxim
that "'God' is in the details" and seem suitable for a law review article.
But legal analyses are often overly complex and subject to abstruse
parsing. Our basic point-which we hope will peer through all the
particulars and will be kept in mind by the reader throughout-is that
regardless of the precise suitability of an exhaustive juxtaposition of
medical malpractice law and the business judgment rule, the essential
validity will be seen of freeing most medical malpractice claims (and
indeed other personal injury cases as well) from the tortuous, even
torturous tangle, of tortious liability in a manner analogous to that
achieved for corporate officers and directors under the business judg-
ment rule.
I. DuTy OF CARE STANDARD FOR PHYSIIANS
Our presentation of a detailed comparison of the duty of care
standard as applied to physicians, as opposed to corporate officers and
directors, is based heavily on an article entitled Medical Malpractice v.
the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias by Hal Arkes and
Cindy Schipani. 29 To begin with, their article contains a discussion of
28 Maurice Rosenberg, Contemporary Litigation in the United States, in LEGAL INSTI-
TUTIONS TODAY 152, 177-78 (HarryJones ed., 1977). But see infra notes 293-300 and
accompanying text.
29 Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587 (1994). Hal R. Arkes is a Profes-
sor of Psychology at Ohio University, and Cindy A. Schipani is a Professor (an Associ-
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health care providers' duty of care that is thorough and accurate
enough to make it unnecessary for us to reinvent this particular
wheel.30 That said, our summary of the duty of care standards for
physicians and corporate officers and directors serves to lay the
groundwork for an extensive analysis of the different legal standards
exacted from health care providers versus corporate officers and
directors.
The existence of a physician-patient relationship establishes a
duty on the part of a physician to adhere to certain acceptable stan-
dards of medicine in the treatment of a patient. Obviously, physicians
are not held strictly liable for their actions; that is, they are not held to
be insurers of a beneficial outcome.3' Instead, physicians are mea-
sured against an objective standard of care that calls for physicians to
possess and apply the degree of skill and knowledge ordinarily held by
average members of the profession in good standing. 32 Inherent in
this standard is the proposition that physicians are expected to "keep
up to date and abreast of changes[,] . .. to take a careful history,
perform a careful examination, function within the confines of the
physician's learning and capability, arrive at appropriate diagnosis,
prescribe and implement appropriate therapies, and refer for appro-
priate consultation when indicated."33 Physicians are held liable for a
patient's injuries when the occurrence of harm is attributable to a
physician's "want of the requisite skill and knowledge, or the omission
to exercise reasonable care, or the failure to use [one's] best judg-
ment."34 Other than these oft-repeated principles, however, many
variables exist concerning due care standards. For instance, due care
standards may be defined by references to local community standards,
may allow physicians to rely on custom, or may require them to allow
patients to exercise informed consent.
3 5
Historically, a physician's conduct was measured and judged by
the prevailing level of care practiced in the defendant's community.
This strict locality rule originated in response to the perceived ineq-
uity in holding rural physicians to the same standards expected of ur-
ate Professor at the time of the publication of the above mentioned article) at the
School of Business Administration at the University of Michigan.
30 Id. at 594-95.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 STEVEN E. PEGALJS & HARVEy F. WACHSMAN, AMERiCAN LAW OF MEDICAL MAL-
PRAnCICE § 3.2, at 97 (2d ed. 1992).
34 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 596 (quoting Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E.
760, 762 (N.Y. 1898)).
35 See id. at 595.
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ban practitioners who possessed greater resources and access to
informationA6 However, unwillingness on the part of physicians to
testify against colleagues practicing in the same community created
serious evidentiary problems for plaintiffs.37 As a result, and for other
reasons as well,38 many states modified their strict locality rule in favor
of either a "national standard" or a "similar community standard."39
Additionally, physicians who hold them themselves out to be special-
ists in a particular area of medicine are also expected to possess the
same skill and knowledge common of competent specialists in their
field.40 So, a national standard is considered by most courts to apply
to specialists' standard of care.
41
Unlike ordinary negligence claims, "courts almost exclusively de-
fer to the customary practice of the [medical] profession"42 because
of the high level of expertise possessed by physicians. Furthermore,
subject to certain quality assurances, physicians, for the most part, set
their own standard of care. 43 Therefore, rather than directly inquir-
ing into the physicians conduct for reasonableness, courts are apt to
focus their examination of a medical malpractice case on whether a
defendant departed from the level of care other physicians in good
standing would have utilized under like circumstances. 44 The reason
for this approach lies not only in the reluctance to allow the laity to
second guess health care professionals, but also in the corollary as-
sumption that physicians who provide care consistent with what is cus-
tomary have presumably not acted unreasonably or imprudently.45
The testimony of other physicians-expert testimony-must ordi-
narily be presented by the plaintiff to show a deviation from recog-
nized standards. 46 Yet, a physician's adherence to custom does not
necessarily shield one from liability. Some courts refuse to consider
36 See id. at 603.
37 See id. at 603-04.
38 Other reasons for the abandonment of the strict locality rule include the fear
that rural patients would receive a substandard level of medical treatment, the stand-
ardization and nationalization of medical education, the nationalization of medical
journals, the availability of modem transportation and communication, and the avail-
ability of physician referrals. See id. at 604.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 605.
41 See id.
42 Id. at 597.
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custom dispositive of the question of liability.47 That is, physicians
may not entirely limit their "responsibility to the skill and knowledge
characteristic of the norm."48 Thus, a plaintiff may still make a prima
facie case for medical malpractice-despite a physician's adherence to
custom-if a physician in using the knowledge and skills possessed
nevertheless fails to satisfy the trier of fact that he or she behaved as a
reasonably prudent physician. At the other end, courts have tradition-
ally not penalized physicians who have departed from customary prac-
tices when evidence exists to show that "new medical techniques are
better than old ones, where a respectable minority of the profession
follow an alternative practice, or where the customs become outdated
or inadequate.
'49
With this admittedly quick summary of the medical standard of
care, we next examine duty of care standards for corporate officers
and directors.
II. DuTy OF CARE STANDARD FOR CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DnRcToRS
A director's duty of care has also been expressed in terms of the
"reasonably prudent" standard, a hypothetical construct that also lies
at the heart of tort law in general. According to the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, which has been adopted in many states, 50 a
47 See id. at 600.
48 Id. at 599.
49 Id. (citations omitted). The so-called "best judgment" rule (of which more
below) is also a criterion in some jurisdictions for a physician's compliance with due
care standards. Id. at 601. The best judgment rule is seen as creating tension in
determining malpractice and leaves room for confusion in the formulation of jury
instructions. Id. For instance, it is argued that it is possible for physicians to exercise
their bestjudgment yet still decide on a course of treatment that would not have been
chosen by competent members of the physician's medical community (whether based
on a "similar community" or "national community" standard). Id. Under such a situ-
ation, it is argued physicians' use of their best judgment is not-nor should it be
misunderstood by a trier of fact to be-a sufficient defense against evidence of incom-
petence. Id. at 603. Because of the concem of jury confusion, courts have shifted
toward eliminating the bestjudgment (or "error ofjudgment) standard. Id. at 602 &
n.62 (citing Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991, 994 (Ala. 1990); Ouellette v.
Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Minn. 1986); Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659,
663 (S.D. 1986); Wall v. Stout, 311 S.E.2d 571, 577 (N.C. 1984); Teh Len Chu v.
Fairfax Emergency Med. Ass'n, 290 S.E.2d 820, 822 (Va. 1982)). But see infra notes
240-44 and accompanying text.
50 Twenty-four states have adopted all or substantially all of the Model Business
Corporation Act (the Model Act) as their general corporation statute. 'REv. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT, Introduction, at xix (1999). These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana,
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director is required to discharge his/her duties "(1) in good faith, and
(2) in manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation... [and] with the care that a person in a like
position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circum-
stances."5 1 Likewise, The American Law Institute's Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance and Structure: Analysis and Recommendation defines a
director's duty in similar terms. 52 Under the common law, the varia-
tions in the duty of care standard range from requiring corporate of-
ficers and directors to exercise the care expected of ordinarily
prudent persons in like circumstances in the conduct of their own
affairs, to employing only the degree of care necessary to avoid gross
negligence. 53 In other words, courts have turned to concepts of both
ordinary (i.e., simple) negligence and gross negligence in resolving
the requisite degree of care.
Note, however, a director's duty of care is not identical in the
decisionmaking and non-decisionmaking context (i.e., oversight). In
the decisionmaking context, the business judgment rule acts as a qual-
ification on the statutory duty of care. 54 The business judgment rule
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at xix n.1. Seven
other jurisdictions have corporation statutes based on the 1969 version of the Model
Act. Id. at xix. These seven jurisdictions are: Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Maine, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Id. at xix n.2.
51 Id. § 8.30(a), (b). The Model Act's 1984 formulation of the duty of care pro-
vided that a director is required to discharge his/her duties with "the care an ordina-
rily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances."
Id. § 8.30.
52 Specifically, duty of care is defined as "the care that an ordinarily prudent per-
son would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar
circumstances." AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUC-
TURE: ANALYsIs AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
53 See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 611.
54 See Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care
and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LAW. 1237, 1240 (1986) [herein-
after Hansen, ALI Corporate Governance Project]. In the non-decisionmaking context,
the test of liability is "some form of results oriented due care standard that measures
the merits of the directors' supervisory performance." Charles Hansen, The Duty of
Care, the BusinessJudgment Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Pro-
ject, 48 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1356 (1993) [hereinafter Hansen, The Duty of Care]. As we
shall see, in the non-decisionmaking context, the required due care standard is much
less demanding than the traditional language often expressed in case law, or in the
Model Act or in the Principles of Corporate Governance. See Hansen, The Duty of Care,
supra, at 1359. (By way of illustration, the REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 8.30 (1984)
speaks of due care in terms of "the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would exercise under similar circumstances.").
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provides that if in the course of management, officers and directors
arrive at a decision that is within their and the corporation's authority,
and for which there is a rational basis, "and they act in good faith, as the
result of their independent discretion and judgment, and uninflu-
enced by any consideration other than what they honestly believe to
be in the best interests of the corporation," then a court will not sec-
ond guess the judgment of the officers and/or directors; nor will a
court "enjoin or set aside [a] transaction or ... surcharge the direc-
tors [and officers] for any resulting loss."55 Therefore, assuming that
the above criteria are satisfied, the business judgment rule greatly re-
stricts the duty of care in the decisionmaking context to the use of
appropriate procedures or processes as the applicable test. In large
measure, liability does not exist for questionable substantive decisions
regardless of whether they are mistakes of judgment or controversial
business decisions.
56
That having been said, however, clearly not all business decisions
come under the umbrella of the business judgment rule. Courts have
held uniformly that conduct that is irrational or egregious in nature is
not protected by the business judgment rule.5 7 They have described
the egregious conduct exception in a number of ways, such as "so un-
wise or unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of the
As one commentator has noted, despite the traditional language used, a careful
examination of the facts and holdings of cases indicate that officers and directors are
found liable in the non-decisionmaking context "only upon an express abdication of
responsibility or upon obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervi-
sion." Hansen, The Duty of Care, supra, at 1359. In other words, only when there is an
abdication of responsibility by officers and directors do courts impose liability. An
often-cited case demonstrating this observation is Francis v. United Jersey Bank 432
A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). In Francis, a director of a reinsurance brokerage was held per-
sonally liable for unlawful payments made by her sons as officers of the corporation
because of her neglect of corporate affairs. The New Jersey Supreme Court found
that the director never read or obtained the firm's financial statements, which would
have plainly revealed the fraud, nor did she know virtually anything of the corpora-
tion's affairs. 432 A.2d at 819. According to Charles Hansen, "[a]n extensive study of
the cases in the non-decision making context indicates that express abandonment of
duty, or patterns of exacerbated neglect amounting to an abandonment of duty, con-
stitute, with rare exception, the only circumstances in which directors were found
liable" despite talk of traditional tort-derived formulations of the duty of care. Han-
sen, The Duty of Care, supra, at 1360. Thus, the similarity of language defining due
care standards for physicians and corporate officers and directors is highly deceptive.
55 HARRY G. HENN & JOHN L ALEXANDER, LAWs OF CORPORATIONS 661 (3d ed.
1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
56 See Hansen, The Duty of Care, supra note 54, at 1357.
57 Id. at 1358.
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directors' sound discretion,"5 8 "an abuse of discretion, " 9 "egregious
or irrational,"60 and "reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard
of the stockholders." 61 Generally, such conduct is treated by the
courts as negating the good faith element of the business judgment
rule. 62 Furthermore, courts have held that corporate waste, or board
action that is illegal or fraudulent on the part of directors, or deci-
sions that are made ultra vires are also outside the protection of the
business judgment rule.
6 3
The broad interpretation that courts have fastened to this doc-
trine,64 and the fact that officers and directors are not held to a stan-
dard of simple negligence, 65 is done to preserve the autonomy and
decisionmaking independence of corporate America. It has been
only in the rarest and most extreme cases that officers and directors
have been held unable to satisfy the lenient standard imposed by the
business judgment rule. According to the American Law Institute, the
twentieth century has produced roughly only forty cases-notwith-
standing the duty of care standard-where directors have been held
liable under the business judgment rule.66 The late Yale University
Professor Joseph Bishop, writing in the lattter 1960s, described his
search for cases imposing liability on directors for ordinary negli-
gence, uncomplicated by self-dealing, as searching for "a very small
58 Id. (citing Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (2d Cir.
1979)).
59 Id. (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6, 815 (Del. 1984)).
60 Id. (citing Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., No. 6085, slip op. at
45 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988), affd, 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989)).
61 Id. at 1366 (citing Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929)).
62 Id. at 1358.
63 Id. at 1365-69.
64 One of the most famous formulations of the business judgment rule, typical of
the broad interpretation that courts have attached to this doctrine, is found in Aron-
son v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that "[iut is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company").
65 There are a fewjurisdictions that do hold officers and directors to the standard
of simple negligence. E.g., Theriot v. Bourg, 691 So. 2d 213 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that in Louisiana the standard of care is simple rather than gross negligence).
These jurisdictions remain a small minority, and they have received wide criticism for
their interpretation of the business judgment rule. See, e.g, Thomas M. McEachin,
Note, Theriot v. Bourg: The Demise of the Business Judgment Rule in Louisiana?, 59 LA. L.
REV. 375 (1998).
66 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 52, § 4.01(a) cmt. h.
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number of needles in a very large haystack."67 Another commentator
has remarked that his efforts in finding such cases have been a "rela-
tively fruitless search. '68 Therefore, the existence of the business
judgment rule has served as an effective means to limit what is often
deemed fruitless and wasteful litigation and to curb liability as to deci-
sions of corporate officers and directors. Suits by shareholders for se-
curities fraud are covered under different laws that are irrelevant for
our present purposes since health care providers do not normally face
suits based on fraud.
Over and above the business judgment rule, forty-six jurisdictions
have also enacted legislation that allows corporations to immunize of-
ficers and directors from personal economic liability to both the cor-
poration and its shareholders for breaches of duty of care.69 With the
exception of improper payments of dividends, all these statutes allow
for corporations to release directors from liability for acts of simple
negligence and most permit exoneration for even acts of gross negli-
gence.70 Therefore, regardless of a jurisdiction's conception of the
business judgment rule, nearly all state legislatures have delegated the
issue of ultimate liability to each individual corporation. Corporations
are free to decide for themselves whether they wish to provide for the
exculpation and/or indemnification of their officers and directors
should they be found to have violated their duty of care as defined by
simple or even gross negligence standards.
71
Policy rationales invoked as a basis for justifying the business
judgment rule and insulating directors from liability are well-settled in
American corporate jurisprudence. Frequently it is emphasized that
courts lack the sagacity and expertise necessary to justify the substitu-
don of their business acumen for that of officers and directors.72 It is
often said that corporate America cannot "risk ... permitting or re-
67 Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnifi-
cation of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968).
68 Hansen, ALI Corporate Governance Project, supra note 54, at 1245.
69 See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 617; see also, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b) (7) (Supp. 2000).
70 See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 617-18.
71 Notice that with the existence of exculpation and/or indemnification it is un-
necessary for officers and directors to allocate a portion of their salaries to the
purchasing of costly malpractice insurance.
72 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259,
1288 (1982) ("Courts... do not possess the experience, expertise, or information
necessary to make complicated business decisions."); see also E. Norman Veasey, Seek-
ing a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of Directors' Business Decisions-An Analytical
Framwork for Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus. LAw. 1247, 1265-66
(1982).
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quiring . .. courts to become, in effect, appellate boards of direc-
tors."73 It is also often asserted that the business judgment rule is
necessary to encourage qualified men and women to serve as corpo-
rate officers and directors, and to motivate such persons to take en-
trepreneurial risks.7
4
Actually, there exists a plethora of possible explanations-many
of which are permutations of one another-as to why courts continue
to adhere to this rule. According to Professor Franklin Gevurtz, such
rationales ultimately fall into four general categories, 75 whereas Dean
Kenneth Davis of the University of Wisconsin Law School concentrates
on five possible explanations for justifying the business judgment rule
and the manner in which courts have responded to duty of care in the
business context.76 As will be shown in greater detail in the ensuing
section, the problem with these categories, however, is not that they
necessarily lack validity, but rather that, as Professor Gevurtz puts it,
73 R. Franklin Balotti &JamesJ. Hanks,Jr., Rejudging the BusinessJudgment Rule, 48
Bus. LAW. 1337, 1341-42 (1993) (citation omitted).
74 Id. at 1342.
75 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Mis-
guided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 304-21 (1994) (stating that the four general
categories are: difficulties with after-the-fact review of business decisions, nature of the
damages, nature of the plaintiff, and utility of compensation or deterrence).
76 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 Wis. L. REv.
573, 574-75, 580-89 (explaining the business judgment rule in terms of risk alloca-
tion (weak and strong form), expertise, imperfect litigation, non-standardization and
sovereignty). The weak form of the risk allocation rationale provides that business
decisions and risks are inseparable, and that sound decisions when made, although
later resulting in loss, should not, with the prescriptive of hindsight, result in personal
liability for corporate officers and directors. According to this view, the business judg-
ment rule is needed in order to ensure healthy risk taking in the business context. Id.
at 574. The strong form of the risk allocation rationale provides that the business
judgment rule is necessary for purposes of risk distribution. Thisjustification sees the
business judgment rule as a necessary tool to shift loss from a small group (such as a
board) across a larger, more diversified group (such as shareholders). See id. at 575.
The expertise rationale provides that business judgments should be for business ex-
perts, such as directors and management, and that judges and juries are ill-equipped
to review such decisions. See id. at 580. The imperfect litigation rationale provides
that litigation, several years after the action in question, cannot fairly evaluate all the
circumstances and factors confronting corporate officers and directors when their
decision was made. See id. The standardization rationale provides that corporate of-
ficers and directors, as a profession, lack institutional arrangements to "develop, de-
bate, and disseminate professional standards." Id. at 583. Finally, the sovereignty
rationale justifies the business judgment rule on the grounds that there exists a statu-
tory directive (at least in states like Delaware) that "the corporation's business and
affairs be managed by or under the direction of its board of directors" not courts. Id.
at 587; see also infra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
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they "prove too much [since] they could apply with equal force to
numerous other situations in which the rule of ordinary negligence
commonly applies."77 This was precisely the reasoning behind the
court's decision in Currie v. United States, where the courtjuxtaposed a
business decision to that of a psychotherapist's and found that in both
areas it was unsuited to review the judgment of the professional.
78
Specifically, the court held that
In the businessjudgment rule, courts defer to the decisions of disin-
terested directors absent bad faith or self-interest. Many of the con-
siderations cited as justifications for the business judgment rule are
applicable to the present case. For example, as with business decisions,
the court is not particularly qualified to review commitment deci-
sions involving mental health and dangerousness. In addition,
these types of commitment procedures require quick action, and
"after the fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate" those
decisions, as in the corporate setting .... Finally, policy considera-
tions favor giving psychotherapists, as well as corporate directors,
significant discretion to use their bestjudgrnent, recognizing that "a
rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives...
may not be in the interest" of the parties or society.
79
Accordingly, the court in Currie held that a psychotherapist judg-
ment rule, similar to the business judgment rule, should be recog-
nized. Under the psychotherapist judgment rule then, simple errors
in judgment on the part of a therapist would not be sufficient for the
imposition of liability.80 Instead, courts would be expected to inquire
into the "good faith, independence and thoroughness" of a therapist's
decision not to commit a patient.81 Factors that the court should con-
sider in making an assessment as to the presence of good faith in-
clude: a therapist's competence and training; a therapist's review of
relevant documents and evidence in an adequate, prompt, and inde-
pendent manner; a therapist's receipt of advice or opinion from an-
77 Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 305-12 (arguing that the business judgment rule
should be abolished and that corporate officers and directors should be held to the
same rules of simple negligence as is the case with other professionals). In his article,
Professor Gevurtz advanced several of the arguments generated in this Article. Un-
like Professor Gevurtz, however, we do not believe that such arguments should be
used to abolish the business judgment rule. Instead, the arguments extended by Pro-
fessor Gevurtz should be utilized to expand at least a variant of the business judgment
rule to other professions such as medicine and engineering and even beyond. See
infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
78 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1083 (M.D.N.C. 1986), affd, 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987).
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other therapist; consideration as to whether the evaluation was made
in light of proper legal standards of commitment; and existence of
other evidence of good faith.
8 2
Likewise in Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital & Health Center, the
Ohio Supreme Court, relying heavily on Currie and the precedence of
New York decisions, adopted a professional judgment rule.83 Specifi-
cally, the court held that "[c]ourts, with the benefit of hindsight,
should not be allowed to second-guess a psychiatrist's professional
judgment. '8 4 As Arkes and Schipani acknowledge, "It is curious that
courts do not similarly hesitate to substitute their judgment for the judgment of
[other] physicians."8 5 The next Section explores this topic in greater
detail.
III. RATIONALES To JuSTiFY DIFFERENCES IN LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIANS
AND CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Having already discussed the duty of care standards that are im-
posed on corporate officers and directors as opposed to physicians,
the next step is to determine what, if any, rationales can in fact justify
the differences in legal liability existing for these two activities. Profes-
sors Arkes and Schipani have extensively tackled the same questions
that we explore in this Article. The initial thrust of their article-up
to' the section entitled "Differences in the Medical and Business Stan-
dards of Care"86-seems to suggest that they would recommend
health care professionals be afforded the same deference as corporate
officers and directors. Instead, however, after several pages of accu-
rately delineating the disparate treatment that exists between physi-
cians and corporate officers and directors, Arkes and Schipani
surprisingly reach the conclusion that "there are legitimate reasons
why the standard of care in business and medicine ought to differ,
and thus any contemplated reform should not attempt to make the
standards identical."
87
Although several of the arguments made by Arkes and Schipani
may appear persuasive at first blush, a more thorough analysis reveals
that their reasoning is insufficient to justify the differences in legal
treatment. Accordingly, we challenge the conclusion that differences
in legal liability for physicians and corporate officers and directors
82 Id.
83 529 N.E.2d 449, 459 (Ohio 1988).
84 Id. at 459-60.
85 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 622 (emphasis added).
86 See id. at 621-30.
87 Id. at 630.
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should necessarily continue. We also regard the bifurcated trial pro-
cedure, a reform strategy advanced by Arkes and Schipani,8s as an in-
effective vehicle to combat the dramatic expansion materializing in
medical malpractice litigation. Instead, we advocate the implementa-
tion of an "early offers" plan, which, as will be explained, contains a
variant of the business judgment rule, as an effective reform.
A. Role of Risk Taking and Failures
In their article, Arkes and Schipani provide not four or even five,
but seven possible explanations of why there exists a difference in le-
gal treatment for physicians, and corporate officers and directors.
First, Arkes and Schipani observe that heightened scrutiny of business
outcomes would'result in corporate officials becoming risk averse in
their decisionmaking capacities.8 9 They contend that such proclivity
would "lessen the corporate official's willingness to cause their corpo-
rations to enter new markets, to develop new products and to take
other rational business risks." 90 But why doesn't the same observation
apply to physicians and other health care professionals? Note that, as
one court put it, limitations on medical malpractice liability seek to
"encourage self-reliant [physicians] to whom patients may safely en-
trust their bodies, and not [ones] who may be tempted to shirk from
duty for fear of a lawsuit" 91
According to Arkes and Schipani, however, risk taking should not
be accepted in the medical context whereas in the business context
risk taking should "not only [be] expected, but explicitly en-
couraged."92 It seems odd to suggest that risk taking is unacceptable
in the medical field. Risk taking is very much alive in the field of
medicine.93 In fact, accompanying the increased effectiveness of
highly technical modem medicine has been a corollary of the possibil-
ity of complications and patient injury during the course of new treat-
ment.94 Moreover, because-biologically speaking-humans are such
highly complicated creatures with intricate systems that respond dif-
ferently to any given treatment, it must be recognized that risk taking
88 See id. at 633-35.
89 Id. at 623.
90 Id. (citation omitted).
91 Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1943).
92 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 623 (citation omitted).
93 SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 185-93
(5th ed. 1984).
94 Robert H. Brook et al., The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of
Care 1975 DuKE L.J. 1197, 1209.
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can never be eliminated from any medical decision, even when deal-
ing with choices for relatively innocuous forms of treatment.
Furthermore, oftentimes physicians are required to make split-
second decisions as to a particular course of treatment due to compli-
cations that may cause the life or well-being of their patient to hang in
the balance. Such circumstances not only arise in the emergency
room; rather, they remain a very real-and perhaps even a com-
mon-feature of any surgical or other invasive procedure. When such
a situation presents itself, a physician's decision often involves substan-
tial risk regardless of the course of treatment selected. It is unreasona-
ble to recommend that physicians should avoid high-risk, but
necessary, medical intervention because, after all, doing nothing (or
avoiding high-risk but necessary procedures) is itself a decision that
will often produce unacceptable consequences. Thus, there are times
when almost any reasonable decision still involves substantial risks,
making risk taking-and perhaps even unfavorable outcomes-
inescapable.
Hence, Arkes and Schipani can be challenged when they state
that " [u]nlike the situation in medicine, risk-taking in business is not only
expected, but explicitly encouraged. '95 A more accurate statement
might well be that, like the situation in business, risk taking in
medicine is expected, but unlike corporate officers and directors,
medical professionals are not free under present law to choose or be
explicitly encouraged to take risks, even though risk taking is an inevi-
table and unavoidable component of their jobs.
In almost any medical decision a physician must consider at least
several factors: the magnitude of the risk of the medical procedure;
the benefit of performing the medical procedure (i.e., action); and
the magnitude of the risk and the consequences of not performing
the medical procedure (i.e., inaction). Regardless of a physician's de-
cision, both treatment and medical passivity involve certain degrees of
risk that require a balancing of such factors. It is true that patients
should (supposedly anyway) have the final say as to whether or not
they are willing to undertake a recognizable or unrecognizable medi-
cal risk,96 but as Professor Franklin Gevurtz points out, "[o] ne cannot
find cases .. .in which doctors have been able to use their patients'
consent to prevent liability for an unreasonable choice of treat-
ment."97 Instead, patients who have suffered harm as a result of ar-
95 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 623 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
96 See Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 311 & n.107 (citing Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d
558, 561 (D.C. 1982)).
97 Id. at 311.
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guably reasonable treatment have relied on lack of informed consent
as an independent basis for recovery.
98
Professor Gevurtz goes on to say,
Nor is it realistic to suggest that professionals can use the consent
process to avoid exercising any judgment by laying out all the op-
tions and all the relevant learning about each option and then let-
ting the patient... play doctor .... The patient... typically wants
a recommendation-that is what one employs the professional for.
This is why the cases speak of informed consent-consent to a rec-
ommended procedure-rather than informed selection of a proce-
dure by the patient.99
Accordingly, because physicians must balance the above factors in
making their recommendation, a cost-benefit analysis can be formu-
lated in the following terms: If the differential in value between treat-
ment (acting) and medical passivity (not acting) does not cause a
substantial benefit, and if the physician recommends treatment, then
the treatment was unreasonable and the physician can be considered
negligent. If, on the other hand, the potential benefits of the treat-
ment outweigh both the risk involved and the consequences of medi-
cal passivity and the physician recommends treatment, then it would
seem that the physician acted reasonably and therefore was not negli-
gent.100 It thus seems fallacious to attempt to justify the difference in
legal treatment between physicians and corporate officers and direc-
tors on the grounds that a higher standard of care imposed on physi-
cians compels them not to take unnecessary risks. Either way, risks are
unavoidable and the existence of a higher standard of care does not
necessarily induce physicians to avoid "failure."
Earlier we quoted Arkes and Schipani's contention that a devia-
tion from the business judgment rule as applied to officers and direc-
tors, "would discourage managerial risk-taking and . . . lessen the
corporate official's willingness to cause their corporations to enter
98 Id.
99 Id. at 311 n.l10.
100 See Eckert v. Long Island R.R1, 43 N.Y. 502 (1871) (upholding a jury verdict
finding that a deceased killed while attempting to rescue a child from the path of an
oncoming train was not negligent). The Eckert court explained, "If, from the appear-
ances, he [the deceased] believed that he could [save the child], it was not negligence
to make an attempt so to do, although believing that possibly he might fail and re-
ceive an injury himself." Id. at 505-06. The court continued, "The law has so high a
regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it,
unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of
prudent persons." Id. at 506. In other words, if the potential benefits of the action
outweigh both the risk involved and the consequences of not acting, then a defendant
is not negligent (nor a plaintiff contribitorily negligent) for so acting.
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new markets, to develop new products and to take other rational busi-
ness risks."' ' ° To the extent true,102 one can just as persuasively argue
that the negligence standard imposed on health care professionals
equally lessens physicians' willingness to perform difficult and high-
risk procedures.103 This would be especially true in terms of a cost-
benefit analysis if, as often seems likely, the potential costs of liability
for difficult and high-risk procedures far exceed the monetary bene-
fits gained for such medical services rendered. The existence of the
negligence standard in the medical profession may especially induce
physicians to avoid high-risk patients and fail to aggressively pursue
new courses of treatment-whether procedure or drug-that have yet
to receive wide acceptance in the medical community. Therefore, al-
though medical researchers may be moving the medical profession to
the vanguard of new approaches to healing, clinicians' trepidation
concerning liability could result in a backlash that may delay the im-
plementation of newly uncovered treatments in the practice setting.
The result is that researchers and clinicians may be functioning at
highly dissimilar paces, with some clinicians remaining behind the
progress of researchers at a rate that is deleterious to patients.10 4
Consequently, fear of liability can result in overdeterrence, which
is oftentimes referred to as defensive medicine. Granted, all the diffi-
culties of defining defensive medicine, many, if not most, physicians
seem to engage in it.105 A 1986 American Medical Association (AMA)
survey found that seventy-eight percent of physicians believed they
practiced defensive medicine. 106 That is, in an effort to shield them-
101 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 623.
102 Note the caveat that this observation is most true if a corporation has not
adopted any exculpatory or indemnifying provisions that shield its officers and direc-
tors from liability.
103 See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care Is the Impor-
tant Standard, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 321, 324; Brook et al., supra
note 94, at 1213, 1217; James W. Brooke, Medical Malpractice: A Socio-Economic Problem
from a Doctors [sic] View, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 225, 231 (1970); Gevurtz, supra note 75, at
312 & n.113 (citing STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATIONS OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE
PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN 453 (Comm. Print 1969)).
104 The problem is that fear of liability can cause practitioners to resist many of
the new advances made by researchers and therefore cause an unnecessary delay be-
tween discovery and implementation. Cf Peter W. Huber, Safety and the Second Best:
The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 308-09
(1985).
105 See M. Schwarz, Liability Crisis: The Physicians' Viewpoint, in MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE-TORT REFORM 18 (James E. Hamner & B.R. Jennings eds., 1987) (citing L. HAR-
VEY & S. SHUBAT, A.M.A. SURVEYS OF PHYSICIANS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1986)).
106 See id. at 20.
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selves from even a distant possibility of a "false positive"-an unwar-
ranted finding of liability-physicians often rely upon unnecessary
and precautionary tests and procedures that are justified by legal
rather than medical rationales.10 7 The effect is that the AMA has esti-
mated that over $15 billion dollars per year is spent on defensive
medicine.10 8 A more recent study concentrating on defensive
medicine suggests that national tort reform lessening defensive
medicine could generate $50 billion in savings annually withoutjeop-
ardizing quality health care.'0 9
Moreover, the difference in the nature of damages between poor
business and medical decisions does not seem a bona fide reason to
explain the difference in legal treatment that exists between corpo-
rate and medical personnel. There is no dispute that poor business
decisions often result in only monetary loss, whereas errors in medical
decisions result in physical injury. But it would appear that this differ-
ence in the nature of damages does not explain why the law holds
officers and directors, as opposed to medical professionals, to dissimi-
lar standards of care. If in fact the nature of damages was sufficient"I0
to explain the different standard of liability for officers and directors
as opposed to physicians, then attorneys"' and accountants likewise
would fall under the protection of a standard of care similar to of-
ficers and directors.112 In other words, it seems odd to contend that
the difference in the nature of damages is a legitimate justification for
107 See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 3 (1994); Armand Leone, Jr., As Health Care Enterprise Liability Expands
... Is ADR the Rxfor Malpractice?, Disp. RESOL. J., Sept. 1994, at 7, 10; see also Laurence
R. Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, LAW & CoNramp. PRoBs., Spring 1986, at
277, 279 (citing AMA Study Reports Sharp Increase in Malpractice Claims Against Physi-
cians, MED. LiAB. ADvIs. SERVICE,Jan. 1980, at 16);Joel Brinkley, A.M.A. Study Finds Big
Rise in Claims for Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1985, at Al.
108 See S. Y. Tan, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault Cure the
Disease?, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 241, 242 (1987).
109 See Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111
QJ. ECON. 353, 387-88 (1996).
110 It may be argued that the nature of damages is a necessary but not sufficient
factor to explain the difference in legal treatment between physicians and corporate
officers and directors. If such an argument were advanced, the next step would be to
determine what other factors, if any, are sufficient to justify this difference.
111 Of course, some of the work that attorneys do is not economic in nature. For
instance, criminal defense work holds more at stake than just the protection of one's
purse. Be that as it may, the bulk of work by most attorneys is purely economic.
112 See Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 313 (remarking that corporate directors are not
unique among potential tort defendants in that their negligence is likely to lead to
economic rather than physical injury-attorneys as a group are the example cited to
make this point).
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the different standards of care imposed on physicians and corporate
officers and directors since that does not explain why the law discrimi-
nates between other potential defendants who cause only economic
damages. Once again a justification relying on the difference in the
nature of damages seems to prove too much.
B. Fear of Liability
Fear of liability is the second-and related-explanation put
forth by Arkes and Schipani to explain why a different standard of
liability exists between physicians and corporate officers and directors.
Although Arkes and Schipani advance this rationale, they are quick to
point out that fear of liability "does not alone justify the differences in
legal treatment in business and medicine." l13 Fear of liability is more
material in the medical context than in the business context and pro-
vides all the more reason why physicians should function under a re-
gime similar to that of the business professional. In their analysis,
Arkes and Schipani correctly state that a heightened standard of care
unaccompanied by assurances of indemnification would exacerbate a
director's fear of liability and result in qualified individuals rejecting
corporate positions. Naturally, as pointed out earlier, fewer people
would be willing to serve as officers and directors if they were held
personally liable for the substance of their decisions." 4 This is espe-
cially true when one considers that liability can result in millions of
dollars in damages.1 15 The result would be that the quality of people
serving on corporate boards would decline along with the quality of
their decisions. In other words, without the protection the business
judgment rule affords directors, the quality of decisions should be ex-
pected to decline instead of improve."
16
This very same reasoning would seem to apply to physicians in
the medical context because fear of liability can also serve as a power-
ful impetus affecting a physician's behavior, often for the worst. As
already highlighted above, data purport to show that an increase in
the rate of malpractice litigation has already caused a great number of
physicians to engage in defensive medicine at onerous costs to the
general public. 1 7 It is often asserted that fear of liability has also
caused many physicians in certain specialties to decline to perform
113 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 624.
114 See Hansen, ALI Corporate Governance Project, supra note 54, at 1239.
115 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 899 (Del. 1985) (Christie, J.,
dissenting).
116 See McEachin, supra note 65, at 384.
117 See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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difficult or experimental procedures, 118 to leave high-risk geographic
areas, 119 to abandon their particular area of medical practice in ex-
change for less litigious fields of medicine, 120 or to even retire early.'
21
Moreover, fear of liability may also have an impact on the rate of stu-
dents willing to matriculate in medical schools. The path to becom-
ing a physician is by all accounts rigorous, time-consuming, and
expensive. 122 If, on top of these hurdles, physicians must fear exces-
sive and undue liability, it is only natural that many gifted and quali-
fied individuals may seek different professions where it is not
necessary to constantly look over one's shoulder. We note that Arkes
and Schipani point out that the existence of licensing exams and
other threshold requirements should in theory prevent unqualified
individuals from replacing physicians who have chosen to abandon a
particular area of their practice or retire completely. 23 Yet licensing
exams and threshold requirements only assure basic competence-
not experience or high quality medical services.
Some errors that occur in the course of medical treatment can
arguably be attributed to lack of experience rather than simple incom-
petence or lack of qualifications. One can speculate that most of the
physicians making career moves to distance themselves from liability
are presumably seasoned veterans with both highly regarded reputa-
tions and significant assets in need of protection. As more and more
older and experienced physicians change specialties, limit their prac-
tice, or retire, one could speculate that a greater number of younger
and less experienced physicians are called on to fill the void left by
these departures. As the inexperience of physicians performing high-
risk procedures or specializing in high-risk areas of medicine in-
creases, the quality of the decisions in these areas of medicine might
well correspondingly decline. Therefore, as in the business context, it
118 E.g., SCHWARZ, supra note 105, at 21;JENNIFER O'SuLLIvAN, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE 5 (CRS Report for Congress 1997) (citing an American College of Obstetrician
and Gynecologists (ACOG) survey which reported that one-quarter of members re-
duced high-risk obstetrical care due to fear of tort liability).
119 Medical Malpractice: Hearings on H.R. 5110 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 80-81 (1986) (citing a
33% drop in number of practicing obstetricians in Florida alone).
120 O'SUvLiVAN, supra note 118, at 5 (citing ACOG study indicating that 12.3% of
members gave up obstetrics in 1992 because of fear of tort liability).
121 Moore & O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1270; Roger Rosenblatt, Why Do Physi-
cians Stop Practicing Obstetrics?: The ImfJact of Malpractice Claims, 76 OBSTETRICS AND GYN-
ECOLOGY 245, 245 (1990).
122 In fact, we argue below that the path to becoming a physician is the most labo-
rious of the many graduate and professional programs available.
123 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 624.
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can be argued that without physicians receiving sufficient protection
by measures similar to the business judgment rule-thereby lessening
their fear of liability-the quality of decisions in high-risk medical ven-
tures should be expected to fall, not rise.
Moreover, when one compares the corporate and medical profes-
sions, it quickly becomes evident that physicians are indeed short-
changed when it comes to protection from liability. Officers and
directors are provided with four times the protection that exists for
physicians. The first line of defense is the less stringent due care stan-
dard that directors are held to-with rare exceptions-in spite of the
traditionally tort-derived language which defines duty in terms of the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under like circumstances. 124 The second line of defense shielding of-
ficers and directors from liability is the business judgment rule. As
already elaborated above, 125 the business judgment rule is the nucleus
of American corporate jurisprudence and has made the presence of
cases finding officers and directors liable for due care violations al-
most nonexistent. 126 The third line of defense shielding officers and
directors from liability is the exculpatory legislation that nearly all
states have passed to further protect corporate officers and directors
above and beyond the protection already afforded by the business
judgment rule.127 The fourth line of defense is the availability of in-
demnification that corporations may grant their officers and direc-
tors. Justifications for the business judgment rule and its legislative
supplements purport to serve judicial economy; to foster an environ-
ment conducive to corporate growth; to protect the corporate entity
from excessive and costly litigation; to afford officers and directors
relative peace of mind thereby reducing work-related distractions and
inefficiency; and to protect the interests of shareholders who would
ultimately bear the burden of paying for the defense and indemnifica-
tion of officers and directors in addition to any monetary remedies
awarded to plaintiffs. Hence, the business judgment rule can be seen
as existing less for the benefit of officers and directors and more for
the benefit of corporate America and capitalism in general.
Note the contrasts: first, physicians do not normally function
under the auspices of a "medical judgment rule." Although some ju-
risdictions, most notably New York,128 do afford their physicians some
124 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., Bell v. N.Y. Health & Hosps. Corp., 90 A.D.2d 270 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982).
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protection under the "professional judgment rule" the scope of such
protection has been limited, with the doctrine most often being in-
voked by psychiatrists. 129 Second, exculpation is not generally availa-
ble for physicians. Third, despite indemnification being common
amongst both physicians and corporate officers and directors, unlike
the latter, physicians must personally gain indemnity by purchasing
their own malpractice insurance policies. 130 In the face of the recur-
rent malpractice crises, premiums for insurance policies have often
skyrocketed.1 1 The result has been that physicians have often been
forced to allocate larger portions of their salaries to cover this expen-
diture.132 Even physicians with impeccable records still suffer from
soaring premiums since malpractice insurance is largely priced by spe-
cialty and location, not individual merit.133
Even worse, in some specialties, physicians complain about how
difficult it is to locate insurers willing to issue any policies. 34 Natu-
rally, many physicians feel both angry and bitter that courts and legis-
latures have allowed matters to get so out of control.'3 5 Consequently,
physicians, more than corporate officers and directors, might well
evoke fear of counterproductive liability as grounds to support a doc-
trine similar to the business judgment rule in the medical context.
C. Lack of Accepted Methodologies
Lack of accepted methodologies is the third explanation pro-
vided by Arkes and Schipani to explain why a different standard of
liability exists for physicians and corporate officers and directors. Ac-
cording to Arkes and Schipani, "There is no commonly accepted
methodology as to what a business person should do when faced with
129 See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 606.
130 One can argue that corporate officers and directors ultimately pay to receive
exculpation by being offered smaller salaries for their services.
131 See 1 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY 285-89 (1991).
132 Although it can be argued that physicians will pass on the expenses of higher
premiums to patients and their health insurance companies, it seems unlikely that
such a response-especially in today's age of cost-containment policies, medical utili-
zation review, and purchasing agreements-will necessarily enable physicians to cap-
ture the increased costs of delivering medicine.
133 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REv. 381, 399 (1994). The
standardization of premium rates for liability insurance is justified on the grounds
that "from the insurer's as well as from the physician's point of view, having been sued
is a sufficiently rare and random event that it gives very little evidence about the gen-
eral quality of a physician's work." See Weiler, supra note 14, at 1191 n.60.
134 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 133, at 401-02.
135 See AM. LAW INST., supra note 131, at 287-89.
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every business situation. 18 6 In contrast, they contend that there are
"commonly accepted methodologies for treating many diseases" and
that the "medical standard of care... presupposes that there is a set
of actions that a competent practitioner should take."
137
Using an example of a surgeon, they assert that "there may be a
general common way of assessing and describing the accepted notion
of what a surgeon is supposed to do and how he or she is supposed to
act in a particular instance."1 38 Yet, does ex post judicial review of
business decisions pose any greater difficulty than that found in the
medical context?
First, contrary to Arkes and Schipani's conclusion, commonly ac-
cepted methodologies would seem to exist concerning what officers
and directors should do in particular situations. The very existence of
a formal business education 39 would seem to challenge the notion
that business decisions are entirely unguided undertakings lacking ac-
cepted standards of norms. 140 Furthermore, the argument that there
is an absence of accepted practices and protocols for officers and di-
136 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 624.
137 Id. at 625.
138 Id.
139 Critics may argue that because the corporate field lacks threshold require-
ments, some officers and directors may not have the knowledge or training of those
who have received a formal business education. But these individuals, under the law
corporate governance standards, are still held to the same objective standard of due
care. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981).
140 See Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 308 & n.92 (citing Gordon Christy, Corporate
Mismanagement as Malpractice: A Critical Reanalysis of Corporate Managers' Duties of Care
and Loyalty, 21 Hous. L. REv. 105 (1984)).
For example, one of the common areas involving board approval, and a fre-
quent source of legal challenges to the board's decision, is the buying and
selling of businesses or major business assets. E.g., Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of
the Directors'Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through
the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 596-97 (1983). Here one of
the primary issues is price. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING
796-804 (1991). While business valuation is certainly more of an art than a
science, to say it is an art without any established guidelines or methodolo-
gies is to ignore huge quantities of available literature. E.g., HAROLD BIER-
MAN, JR. ET AL., QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS (8th ed.
1991); ARTHUR S. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (5th ed.
1953); EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE
(1972); DENNIS E. LOGUE, HANDBOOK OF MODERN FINANCE (2d ed. 1990);
JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY (5th ed. 1980); J.
FRED WESTON & EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE (4th ed. 1972).
Id. at 308 n.92; cf Davis, supra note 76, at 582-84 (discussing the possibility of stan-
dards for business professionals, such as directors, in the context of the business judg-
ment rule).
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rectors becomes even more suspect for actions undertaken at the level
of the board of directors.' 41 Directors serving on a board act together
as one board and their decisions represent a consensus that was
reached by all or most of its members. Consequently, a board's deci-
sion is the product of group deliberations-not a single individual's
best judgment, as may be the case with physicians. 142 Therefore, if
anything, one would expect to find that group decisions are grounded
in reasoning that can be examined by after-the-fact reviewers. Often
the same cannot be said for physicians.
Assuming, however, that business decisions are more nebulous in
nature and do pose greater difficulties for ex post review when com-
pared to medical decisions, this would arguably provide all the more
reason why officers and directors should not need the protection of
the business judgment rule.' 43 According to Professor Gevurtz, the
more discretionary a decision and/or the less a decision is held in
unanimity, the more difficult it becomes for claimants to establish that
a particular decision was unreasonable-much less that a different de-
cision would have necessarily produced a more favorable outcome.'4
Therefore, a purported lack of methodologies in the business context
would not seem to disserve corporate officers and directors in litiga-
tion; instead, it works to the detriment of those who carry the burden
of proof-namely claimants.
145
With regard to physicians, the art of medicine has not-yet,
anyway-been reduced to rigid guidelines and protocols detailing
what is and is not acceptable for a given patient during the course
of treatment. 146 The Institute of Medicine' 47 defines practice guide-
141 See Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 308.
142 See id. at 308 & n.93 (citing see, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsid-
ered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1, 6-7 (1980) ("This is not
to say that group deliberations yield better results; merely that there is more likely to
be an articulated rationale or rationales for the group's action.")). But for the distinc-
tion between "deciding" and "doing," see infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
143 As the reader will sense, we do not in any way advocate the elimination of the
business judgment rule; instead, we argue that many of the rationales given to justify
its exclusive existence seem misplaced.
144 See Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 309-10. For an analysis examining why trial law-
yers are not more often found negligent for their trial work due to the largely judg-
mental nature of their of decisions see id.
145 See id. at 310.
146 For an insightful article echoing many of the points made herein concerning
practice guidelines, see Karen A. Butler, Comment, Health Care Quality Revolution: Le-
gal Landmines for Hospitals and the Rise of the Critical Pathway, 58 ALB. L. REV. 843, 856
(1995).
147 The Institute of Medicine is a private, nonprofit society of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences. See IOM, supra note 11, at iii.
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lines 148 as "systematically developed statements [of recommendations
for patient care management] to assist practitioner and patient deci-
sions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circum-
stances. '149 Practice guidelines have been in existence since the early
1930s.1 50 In response to private institutions implementing guidelines,
and some courts utilizing these guidelines, Congress 151 and several
states have passed legislation concerning the use and development of
medical malpractice guidelines.1 52 In general, guidelines are recom-
mendations that serve the purpose of "describing effectiveness and ap-
propriateness of alternate approaches in detecting, diagnosing, and
managing specific symptoms or disease states."153 The problem is that
the many mysteries of disease and illness and the human body's re-
sponse to them, are still in many regards unclear. Even when clear,
however, the problems of developing a consensus as to specified ther-
apies (when several alternatives are available) and the detailed termi-
nology necessary to describe the characteristics of both disease and
courses of treatment still persist.
Also, because individuals may respond differently to any one
common form of treatment, which may be the result of allergic reac-
148 Other terms such as "standards," "parameters," and "practice options" are also
sometimes included in a discussion of medical guidelines. Each bears different defin-
itive levels of recommendation and meaning. A report to Congress on "Practice
Guidelines" by the United States General Accounting Office defined a standard as
"practice policies [in] which the consequence of an intervention on health and eco-
nomics is sufficiently well-known and there is virtual unanimity (by the promulgators)
about the desirability or undesirability of the intervention and about the proper use,
or non-use of that intervention." Lori Rinella, Comment, The Use of Medical Practice
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation-Should Practice Guidelines Define the Standard
of Care?, 64 UMKC L. REV. 337, 337 n.5 (1995) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PRACTICE GUIDELINES: THE EXPERIENCE OF MEDICAL SPECIALTY SOCIETIES, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 12 (1991)). Practice guidelines "are recommendations
that are understood well-enough to permit meaningful decisions about proper uses of
a health care intervention, and an appreciable, but nonunanimous, majority of physi-
cians and informed patients share the preferences regarding the intervention." Id.
Practice options refer to when an "intervention is a reasonable choice of course but
the outcomes are not known, or a significant portion of physicians or patients feel the
intervention is not worth the benefit, not known or are evenly divided." Id.
149 Id. at 337 (citing Kathleen N. Lohr, Guidelines for Clinical Practice: What They Are
and Why They Count, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 49, 49 (1995) (citation omitted)).
150 See Gilbert B. Bluhm, President's Page: Practice Parameters-Physician Input Is Key,
93 MICH. MED. 68, 68 (1994).
151 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 § 1901, 42 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp.
V 1999).
152 See Rinella, supra note 148, at 339.
153 Id. at 338 (citing Adam Wolff, Practice Parameters in Health Reform: New State
Approaches Precede Clinton Plan, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 394 (1995)).
2002] TREATING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 403
ions, medication, their body's chemistry, other preexisting ailments,
etc., no guideline can possibly capture the appropriate treatment for
all persons-especially when dealing with highly complex areas of
medicine. Oftentimes, a diagnosis may leave a physician with several
acceptable methods of treatment, each of which may bear compara-
ble, but different, risks that may materialize for the patient at hand.
In order for guidelines to account for such situations, many would
have to be drafted in general terms while others would have to be
drafted in confining detail, both being therefore suspect. Moreover,
at times several different conflicting guidelines may be written for the
treatment of one particular condition, which brings into question the
reliability of some guidelines, both generally or for any given case.
In other words, the practice of medicine is case specific. It re-
quires physicians to rely on science, experience, intuition, and the his-
tory of a particular patient in order to determine the appropriate
course of treatment. It is difficult for any guideline to capture all
these factors, and, should one be developed, its utility in practice
might be questionable. Additionally, a consequence of such guide-
lines might be the underdevelopment of clinical reasoning skills, espe-
cially for young physicians.15 4 Simply put, it is often asserted that the
art of medicine cannot be relegated to the status of a cookbook.
Consequently, though general guidelines may prove useful to a
physician, should deviation from such guidelines justify liability if an
unfavorable result occurs? This question seems especially appropriate
since guidelines only reflect those practices held in acceptance by the
majority whereas other practices supported by a respected minority go
unendorsed as alternatives. Moreover, because medicine is an evolv-
ing discipline it would be difficult for published standards of protocols
to reflect cutting-edge approaches to healing. The development and
dissemination of guidelines for use by practitioners is estimated to
take approximately two years.155 In certain medical fields this produc-
tion rate results in many guidelines becoming outdated prior to their
general availability. This was the situation in Sweden, where as a re-
sult of guidelines being unable to reflect recent medical advance-
ments, a fifteen-year-old clinical guideline program was
abandoned. 56 Furthermore, physicians' efforts to avoid liability may
154 See Butler, supra note 146, at 854-55 (citing Steven H. Woolf, Practice Guide-
lines: A New Reality in Medicine (pt. 3), 153 ARCHIVES INTnRNAL MED. 2646, 2650
(1993)).
155 See id.
156 Id. at 855. As to the widespread failure to follow practice guidelines in the U.S.
see Michael D. Cabana et al., Wy Don't Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines? A
Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458, 1458 (1999).
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also result in physicians strictly adhering to certain guidelines, despite
the existence of more suitable treatments.1 57 It should also be noted
that certain percentages of patients complain of symptoms that are
uncharacteristic of any familiar categories of diagnosis and treat-
ment.15 8 According to Gevurtz, "While different doctors place the
proportion of such patients at different levels, this level may be as
high as eighty-five percent.' 59 Assuming this supposition true, it
would only further bolster a belief that the availability of methodolo-
gies does not appropriately serve as a basis to explain why a difference
in legal liability exists for physicians and corporate officers and
directors.
On this subject of accepted methodologies, Dean Kenneth Davis,
of the University of Wisconsin Law School, states that the difference
between liability for professionals such as physicians and immunity for
corporate officers and directors stems
not [from the fact] that we assume that judges andjuries] have the
personal expertise to make an informed assessment [of the profes-
sional actions of, say, a neurosurgeon] on their own. We instead
rely on expert testimony. Underlying that reliance is the assump-
tion that there exists a generally accepted body of principles and
procedures dictating how a reasonable neurosurgeon should re-
spond in a variety of situations. Consequently, we are comfortable
permitting the fact finder to draw inferences about what the defen-
dant neurosurgeon should have done from the expert's opinion on
what he or she would have done if confronted with the same
situation. 16
0
But foregoing material in this Article' 6 ' undermines confidence
in the validity of expert opinion as a comparatively ready means of
disposing of medical malpractice cases, in contrast, for example, to
cases against corporate officers and directors. Note furthermore, that
in the typical medical malpractice case there is not just one expert
opinion to guide the lay trier of fact, but two (or more). And, given
157 See Ed Hirshfeld, Use of Practice Parameters as Standards of Care and in Health Care
Reform: A View from the American Medical Association, 19 JOINT COMM'N J. ON QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT 322, 323 (1993).
158 See Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 309.
159 Id. at 309 (citing DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACrIONER: How PROFES-
SIONALS THINK IN ACTION 16 (1983)); see also Bovbjerg, supra note 103, at 329 (mea-
suring the quality of medical care is especially difficult given that medicine is as much
an art as a science and given the complexities of the human organism); David
Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1179,
1182 (stating that standards of medical practice are ambiguous).
160 Davis, supra note 76, at 581-82.
161 See supra notes 10-14, 29-49 and accompanying text.
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the adversarial nature of litigation, those expert opinions will entail
dramatically opposing opinions on what the defendant physician did,
should have done, or should not have done. Thus, medical malprac-
tice cases inevitably turn lay triers of fact into "appellate boards of
physicians," an outcome just as fearful as turning the laity into "appel-
late boards of directors."
1 62
In measure though, Davis's discussion can be seen as echoing, in
part at least, an extraordinarly perceptive and convincing thesis ad-
vanced by the senior author's colleague at the University of Virginia
School of Law, Professor Kenneth Abraham. Abraham argues that
typical personal injury litigation, arising, say, from auto accidents, is
based on "unbounded" standards, thereby becoming excessively fact-
oriented. 163 According to this view, such litigation thus fails to grow
into predictable rules upon which the outcome of litigation can be
forecast.' 64 One is reminded of the remarks of Karl Llewellyn in an-
other context. Specifically, that for the courts,
the cases run into the [hundreds of] thousands and with no reck-
onability anywhere in sight. Unpredictably, [courts] ... proceed to
spit the [accident] victim for the barbecue [or] [w]ith equal unpre-
dictability they [impose liability] .... The difficulty with these tech-
niques is... they fail to accumulate either experience or authority
in the needed direction: that of marking out for any given type of
[incident] . . . what ... a court will insist upon as essential to ...
[liability] .... 165
On the other hand, Abraham characterizes litigation in areas
such as medical malpractice as being "bounded"-principally by ac-
cepted practices delineated by expert testimony. 66 But in this re-
spect, Abraham seems overly modest in applying his very telling
theory. Actually, the hugely indeterminate nature of medical mal-
practice litigation belies the tight distinction between bounded and
unbounded categories of tort liability. True, medical malpractice
cases might be characterized as "bounded," if you can call it that, by
the diametrically contrasting views of experts at opposite ends of a
wide spectrum. But how helpful in supplying certitude for a given
case or future cases is such a boundary?
162 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
163 See Kenneth Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1187,
1193-94 (2001).
164 See id.
165 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADIIoN: DECIDING APP.ALS 364-65
(1960) (discussing vagueness in the enforceability of unconscionable contracts).
166 See Abraham, supra note 163, at 1199.
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It seems especially significant that Abraham assigns product liabil-
ity cases to the "unbounded" category. He writes:
We have too many different ways of behaving, and too many differ-
ent conceptions of how people ought to behave, to expect wide-
spread agreement about which individual behaviors count as
reasonable and which as negligent [according to the standards of
the community]. In factually more complex but still unbounded
cases-for example, products liability cases involving design defects
or the failure to warn-it is even less likely that there is any kind of
single community [standard] ... about how safe a particular prod-
uct design should be, or how much detail should be included in a
warning about the side effects of a prescription drug.167
And yet product liability, like medical malpractice, cases involve
professional standards-in this case engineering instead of medical.
That explains why product liability, like medical malpractice cases,
normally require expert testimony. If they nevertheless end up for
Professor Abraham as unbounded, that seems to blur the availability
of professional standards enunciated by expert witnesses as control-
ling. In practice, medical malpractice cases turn out to be not so
much bounded but about as vague and standardless as many of those
areas Abraham characterizes-and so effectively condemns-as
unbounded.
D. The Aura of Science
The aura of science is the fourth explanation put forth by Arkes
and Schipani to explain why a different standard of liability exists be-
tween physicians and corporate officers and directors. Even though
this explanation is presented as a possibility that needs to be explored,
it is not one that is taken seriously even by Arkes and Schipani. The
argument goes that "[b]ecause illness has chemical, biological, or
physical causes, and because chemistry, biology, and physics are sci-
ences, a layperson may assume that a physician trained in science
should be able to deduce the cause of every possible symptom."168
Consequently, laypersons may hold physicians to know the outcome
of all possible physical or chemical treatments. All bad outcomes,
therefore, may be deemed the offspring of either negligent diagnosis
or treatment, or both.
167 Abraham, supra note 163, at 1195.
168 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 626.
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But, as Arkes and Schipani conclude, physicians are not by any
means omnipotent nor are they guarantors of good outcomes. 169 If,
however, it should be shown that the above skewed perception of real-
ity is an accurate depiction of a typical layperson's mentality concern-
ing the diagnosis and treatment of disease, then this would provide all
the more reason to question the second-guessing of physicians by
laypersons in medical malpractice cases. In sum, the use of "the aura
of science" as a means to resolve the difference in legal treatment be-
tween physicians and corporate officers and directors is questionable
at best, as Arkes and Schipani quickly concede.
E. Threshold Requirements
Threshold requirements are the fifth explanation suggested by
Arkes and Schipani to help explain why a different standard of liabil-
ity exists for physicians and corporate officers and directors. Arkes
and Schipani observe that "unlike the high threshold requirements to
enter the health professions, there are virtually no threshold require-
ments of significance for serving on a corporate board. There is no
education required, no licensing requirement, no state board to
pass." 170 They write, "All that is needed to serve on a corporate board
is a majority vote of the shareholders voting at the shareholders' an-
nual meeting."' 71 Not so for physicians. As indicated earlier, physi-
cians have extensive, rigorous licensing requirements that they must
meet before they are permitted to practice medicine. Those unable
to satisfy these requirements are forbidden from practicing medicine
while those who meet all such requirements are given a monopoly
allowing them alone to practice. 172 Arkes and Schipani then conclude
that "[p]ersons who are granted this monopoly may be obligated to
meet a much higher standard than business persons. The latter have
no threshold requirements, and thus society may have lower expecta-
tions for them."'
73
But if anything, in the case of corporate officers and directors the
lack of required formal training, the absence of licensing exams, and
the non-existence of state board exams provide courts with legitimate
reasons why triers of fact should be able to second guess the decisions
of corporate officers and directors. Since a person of no or highly
169 Id.; see also Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 682 (RI. 1972) (holding that
physicians do not guarantee either a correct diagnosis or successful treatment).
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questionable training, prudence, and business perspicacity can serve
as a corporate officer or director, it could persuasively be argued that
the interest of shareholders lies in allowing courts to supervise busi-
ness decisions to ensure that officers and directors are living up to an
appropriate standard. Though of course other problems would arise
if courts were permitted to serve as appellate boards of directors; on a
strictly threshold requirement argument, the absence of criteria to
separate the competent from the incompetent would justify courts'
reevaluating the decisions of officers and directors more than those of
physicians.
Thus, the comprehensive education and training that physicians
receive provide all the more reason why courts should not routinely
be in the business of second-guessing the medical decisions of physi-
cians. Absent bad faith,' 74 a presumption might well be made that in
making medical decisions physicians acted on an informed basis and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the
patient. Medicine is by far the most demanding graduate or profes-
sional program in the country. Unique to other graduate or profes-
sional schools, all AMA certified medical schools have traditionally
required applicants to satisfy a comprehensive list of undergraduate
courses prior to enrolling into medical school.175 Applicants have tra-
ditionally been required to take one year of chemistry and lab, one
year of organic chemistry and lab, one year of biology and lab, one
year of physics and lab, one year of mathematics (required by most
medical schools), and some programs recommend a course in bio-
chemistry. 176 Because competition into medical schools is extremely
fierce, and some might even say cutthroat, 177 students attending
American medical schools are extremely bright and competent with a
174 Intentional misconduct, egregious, irrational, wanton, criminal, or fraudulent
conduct could all be treated as negating good faith. That is, they can be seen as the
equivalent of bad faith. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
175 For instance there are no pre-law and generally no pre-business requirements
that must be satisfied before entering American law or business schools.
176 Duke University School of Medicine is one such school that encourages its
medical students to complete a biochemistry course before the first day of medical
school classes. BULLETIN OF DUKE UNInERsrrY 2000-2001, DOCTOR OF MEDICINE PRO-
GRAM 35 (2001), http://registrar.duke.edu/bulletins/Medicine/2000/doc_med.PDF.
177 The year 2000 medical school acceptance rate compiled by U.S. News & World
Report speaks to the briskness of competition for medical school seats. Of the top fifty-
one research medical schools in the report, forty schools had a single digit acceptance
rate. Of these top fifty-one schools, Boston University had the most stringent accept-
ance rate (2.1%) and the University of Massachusetts-Worcester had the least strin-
gent (22.2%). Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 2001, at 88,
available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/beyond/bcrank.htm.
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certain propensity toward the sciences. They are commonly described
as the "crime de la crme." Once in medical school, no other gradu-
ate or professional school is physically, emotionally, and intellectually
as demanding, let alone longer in duration.1 78 After completing an
intensive medical school curriculum that requires passing Part 1 and
Part 2 of the United States Medical Licensing Exam (USMLE), gener-
ally all graduates are then required to intern for one year's time at the
conclusion of which they must pass Part 3 of the USMLE. Thereafter,
medical school graduates must satisfy a residency program that spans
some years in length, the precise number depending on specialty and
sub-specialty. At the conclusion of each residency program, physi-
cians then face their specialty-specific state board exam.
179
Thus, the skills and knowledge that physicians possess stem from
over a decade, and in some sub-specialties two decades, of training. It
seems questionable that the tort system would expect ordinary layper-
sons to routinely grasp in a short period of a trial what it has taken
physicians (with scientifically-oriented minds) years to learn, espe-
cially when they must choose between the diametrically opposing
views of competing expert witnesses. The fact that expert witnesses
must talk down to jurors and speak in "plain English" even further
calls into question juries being called on to resolve typical medical
malpractice disputes. Moreover, one must keep in mind that the tri-
ers of fact are not being asked to resolve disputes that are black and
white; such disputes are more likely resolved by settlement or pretrial
motions. Instead, triers of fact are often being asked to decide the
taxing gray borderline cases. Therefore, contrary to Arkes and Schi-
pani, threshold requirements only further undermine the proposition
that courts are equipped to serve the role of "appellate boards of
physicians."' 8 0
F. Reliance on Market Efficiencies
Reliance on market efficiencies is the sixth explanation proposed
by Arkes and Schipani to help answer why there remains a difference
178 Medical school and dental school are four years in duration, law school is three
years, a Masters of Business Administration (MBA) program is two years, a masters
degree typically requires two to three years of study, and a Ph.D. program usually
takes at least three to four years to complete. Certified public accountants (CPAs) are
not required to have a graduate degree to sit for the CPA exam; 120 credit hours was
formerly required but this has recently been changed to 150 credit hours. Most engi-
neers work with a bachelors of science degree that takes four to five years to earn.
179 No other profession, to our knowledge, requires its members to complete a
residency program.
180 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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in legal liability for physicians and corporate officers and directors.
According to this argument, various market mechanisms serve as
checks on officers' and directors' behavior, and help assure that the
interests of management and shareholders are in accord.18' Arkes
and Schipani list several market mechanisms that aid in curbing man-
agerial abuse and misconduct; these include "the managerial labor
market, the product market, the capital market and the market for
corporate control."' 82
The managerial labor market serves as an effective check on man-
agement by rewarding satisfactory job service with continued employ-
ment, compensation, and the potential for advancement'83 while
penalizing suboptimal performance with termination, demotion,
and/or reduced pay. The product market, which requires firms to
operate efficiently in order to remain competitive and profitable, also
serves as a strong market check on corporate officers and directors.'
84
Assuming a healthy market, poor decisions that lead to the output of
overly expensive or inadequate products would result in rival compa-
nies competing to produce better products more efficiently (i.e.,
lower costs), ultimately passing on the savings to consumers. The firm
governed by poor management can obviously be expected to suffer
from a loss of sales and a decrease in profit. Prolonged losses may
eventually lead to bankruptcy and the loss of jobs for employees, as
well as corporate officers and directors. Consequently, the product
market helps assure that management and shareholders continue to
function in a symbiotic relationship.
Moreover, the capital market too serves as a check by punishing
inefficiently run corporations by making their accessibility to capital
more difficult and costly.185 Ultimately, however, it is often argued
the market for corporate control serves as the greatest check on cor-
porate management. 8 6 Corporations that are poorly managed may
also be undervalued, thereby making them attractive and vulnerable
targets for hostile takeovers. Takeover companies that do succeed in
acquiring a target firm would then be expected to implement profit-
maximizing policies to capture the intrinsic value of their newly ac-
181 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CONELL L. REV.
261, 275-76 (1986); David M. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of
Part IfV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 672-82 (1984).
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quired corporation. This in turn would commonly include the termi-
nation of top management from the target company. Therefore, the
market for corporate control forces officers and directors to either
lead efficiently and effectively or risk losing their posts.
Arkes and Schipani contend, however, that "many of the disin-
centives to corporate managers for poor judgement ... simply do not
apply in medicine."18 7 But in fact some market and related mecha-
nisms do exist in medicine to deter substandard behavior in the deliv-
ery of health care. First, the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)
purports to serve to constrain and penalize physicians who exercise
poor judgement in treating patients. Authorized by congressional ac-
tion in 1986 as a component of the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act (HCQIA), 8 8 the NPDB is a federal repository to compile and dis-
seminate information regarding not only medical malpractice pay-
ments, but also adverse disciplinary actions involving hospital
privileges or society memberships registered against health care
professionals.
HCQIA requires any entity (including insurers), making any pay-
ment on any written medical malpractice action or claim, to report
such payments to both the NPDB and the State Licensing Board,
within thirty days of actual payment, subject to a $10,000 fine for each
incident of non-reporting. 189 State Boards of Medical Examiners and
health care entities, such as hospitals, are also required to report any
professional review action adversely affecting the clinical privileges or
licensure of a physician or dentist for longer than thirty days.190
HCQIA further requires the NPDB be notified when a physician's
clinical privileges have been relinquished under circumstances when
the physician's professional conduct or competence is under investi-
gation, or when a physician has relinquished his/her clinical privi-
leges in return for an investigation not to be conducted. 191
The Act's federal mandatory reporting requirements exceed
those existing under relevant state law. Under HCQIA, a physician
cannot be hired on the medical staff of a health care entity or be
granted clinical privileges by a health care entity until such entity has
received requisite information from the NPDB. 192 Once a physician
has joined the staff of a health care entity or been granted clinical
187 Id. at 629.
188 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3784 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994)).
189 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a), (c) (1994); see also IOM, supra note 11, at 121.
190 Seeid. § 11133(a)(1)(A).
191 See id. § 11133(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
192 Seeid. § 11135(a)(1).
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privileges, such entity is then required under the Act to request infor-
mation at least once every two years on its physicians. 19 3 Health care
entities are also given the freedom to request information from the
NPDB at all other times. 19 4 A hospital that fails to request informa-
tion respecting a physician as required by 42 U.S.C. § 11135 (a) is pre-
sumed to have knowledge of all information contained in the data
bank,195 thus exposing a hospital to liability in a malpractice action for
employing an incompetent physician. 1
96
The existence of the NPDB and its mandatory use by health care
entities has created much concern and anxiety on the part of physi-
cians. As can be imagined, most physicians fear that adverse actions
found in their NPDB files will harm their professional careers, espe-
cially since "health care entities attempt to distance themselves from
physicians who might expose the institution or organization to an in-
creased risk of vicarious and/or corporate liability.' 97 The corporate
liability theory stems from the case of Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital.198 Corporate liability is a doctrine under which a
hospital is held liable if it fails to uphold the appropriate standard of
care owed to patients, namely the duty to secure a patient's safety and
well-being while at the hospital.199 That duty is nondelegable and is
owed directly to the patient.2
00
193 See id. § 11131 (a) (2).
194 Note, however, whenever possible, hospitals may often settle claims on their
own without including any physician's name in the settlement in order to avoid the
reporting requirement as to physicians.
195 See42 U.S.C. § 11135(b).
196 For more information on the NPDB and its operation, see generally Susan L.
Homer, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions, Applica-
tions and Implications, 16 AM.J.L. & MED. 455 (1990); Ila S. Rothschild, Operation of the
National Practitioner Data Bank, 25 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 225 (1992).
197 Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAuLJ. HEALTH CARE L.
751, 770 (1997) (citing BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW 265-88, chs. 7-8
(1995)); see also Robert L. Wilson, Jr., Corporate Negligence of Hospital in 2 MEDICAL &
Hosp. NEGLIGENCE §§ 20:01-:12 (MilesJ. Zaremski & Louis S. Goldstein eds., 1988);
Robert L. Wilson, Jr., Respondent Superior, in 2 MEDICAL & Hosp. NEGLIGENCE, supra,
§§ 19:0-:10; Jennifer Steinhauer, Legislators Approve Web List Disclosing Missteps by Doc-
tors, N.Y. TimEs, June 24, 2000, at Al. But as to the inadequacy of the NPDB and other
reporting systems, see, for example, Sandra G. Boodman, Still Trying To Open Database
on Doctors, WASH. PosT, Mar. 7, 2000, at 13 (Health Magazine); Must Mistakes Happen?,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 2, 1999, at A38; Jennifer Steinhauer, Hospitals in City Faulted by State
for Failing To Report Many Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at Bi; James B. Stewart,
Doctors Who Kill, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2000, at B7.
198 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
199 See Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991).
200 Id.
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The theory underwent further development under Thompson v.
Nason Hospita;20 where the court held that a hospital's duties extend
into four general areas: (1) the maintenance of safe and adequate
facilities and equipment; (2) the selection and retention of only competent
physicians, (3) the overseeing of all persons permitted to practice
medicine within its walls; and (4) the formulation, adoption, and en-
forcement of adequate rules.202 With the existence of respondeat su-
perior, and other agency and corporate liability rules,203 the
incentives for hospitals to distance themselves from high-risk medical
providers are arguably greater than ever.
Accordingly, physicians perceived as being "second-rate" medical
providers should encounter similar difficulties through market and
regulatory forces, as those existing for "second-rate" corporate officers
and directors through the managerial labor market and the market
for corporate control. Just as one would expect that unsatisfactory job
performance by officers and directors would lead to poor performers
being terminated, demoted, losing corporate control, or having diffi-
culties finding new employment, likewise, one would expect that phy-
sicians with blemished dossiers would also suffer unpleasant fates such
as discharge from medical staff positions, loss of clinical privileges,
204
loss of patients, or even inability to find new employment.20 5 Further-
201 Id. at 703.
202 See id. at 707.
203 The doctrine of corporate liability has been recognized by at least seventeen
jurisdictions. See Bryant v. McCord, No. O1A01-9801-GV-00046, 1999 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 26, at *27 (Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999) (citing the following jurisdictions as having
recognized the corporate liability doctrine, although declining to adopt the doctrine
in Tennessee: Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958, 960 (Ariz. 1976); Elam
v. ColI. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 157 (Ct. App. 1982); Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d
544, 550 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989);
Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ga. 1972); Darling v.
Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ill. 1965); Ferguson v. Gonyaw,
236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475,
484-85 (Mo. 1972); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'l Hosp., 173 N.W.2d 881, 884
(Neb. 1970); Corleto v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 537-38 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law. Div. 1975); Raschel v. Rish, 488 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (App. Div. 1985); Blanton v.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 354 S.E.2d 455, 457-58 (N.C. 1987); Benedict v. St.
Luke's Hosps., 365 N.W.2d 499, 504 (N.D. 1985); Park N. Gen. Hosp. v. Hickman, 703
S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash.
1984); Utter v. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213, 215 (W. Va. 1977);Johnson v.
Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Wis. 1981)).
204 The loss of clinical privileges would have a crippling effect on those physicians
whose practice depended on the use of hospital facilities.
205 It has been argued that the existence of the NPDB discourages physicians from
settling disputes since one of the consequences of settlement is the reporting of a
physician's name to the data bank. See Weiler, supra note 14, at 1168-69. A sensible
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more, the fact that state medical boards are "easing... patient access
to identifiable data about individual physicians' legal and disciplinary
histories [only] heighten[s] physician incentives to avoid adverse legal
entanglements .... -206
It is important to note that quite apart from such external forces,
physicians as a group purport to impose a far more demanding stan-
dard on themselves and their colleagues than legal strictures-namely
through a physicians' standard of "perfection."20 7 Physicians in gen-
eral are conditioned to a "culture of infallibility."208 According to Pro-
fessor Marshall Kapp, errors in patient care are seen by physicians as
not so much the result of external factors such as poor training, tech-
nique, or fatigue, but "as manifestations of unacceptable character
flaws .... -209 Professor Kapp also observes that for physicians "being
accused in a public forum, such as a court, of committing an error by
an external scrutinizer cannot be interpreted.., in any manner other
than as a deeply personal affront.
'210
Consequently, the existence of corporate liability, the NPDB, the
facility with which patients are obtaining access to individual physi-
cians' legal and disciplinary history, and the perfectionist mentality
that is common among most physicians all arguably serve as checks to
deter unacceptable behavior in the delivery of medical care. Contrary
to Arkes and Schipani, then, at least some market and other mecha-
nisms comparable to those constraining officers and directors are in
place to control the behavior of physicians and assure that patients
receive quality medical care. Hence, reliance on market efficiencies
solution may be to waive mandatory reporting requirements for physicians who settle
cases below a certain monetary threshold (Weiler, himself, suggests a $50,000 thresh-
old as an example to illustrate his point). Id. at 1169. Such a compromise seeks to
preserve the virtues of deterrence and market mechanisms while also remedying one
of the major disincentives that exist to settlement. See Robert Pear, Group Asking U.S.
for New Vigilance in Patient Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at Al. But see supra note
194.
206 Kapp, supra note 197, at 770; see also Robert Pear, Inept Physicians Are Rarely
Listed as Law Requires, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2001, at Al.
207 Kapp supra note 197, at 755 & n.17 (citing LoUIs SNYDER, Disclosure of Errors and
the Threat of Malpractice, in ETHICAL CHOICES: CASE STUDIES FOR MEDICAL PRACTICE 47,
51 (Louis Snyder ed., 1996)). One study found that in a profession that prizes perfec-
tion, error is essentially forbidden. See Marc Newman, The Emotional Impact of Mistakes
on Family Physicians, 5 ARCHIVES F m. MED. 71, 72 (1996); see also Daniel H. Novack et
al., Calibrating the Physician: Personal Awareness and Effective Patient Care, 278 JAMA 502,
505 (1997).
208 Kapp, supra note 197, at 755 (quoting Levy, Code Blue, 7 HARV. PUB. HEALTH
REV. 36, 39 (1995)).
209 Id.
210 Id. (citing Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851 (1994)).
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may not sufficiently explain the stark difference between physicians
and corporate officers and directors in the eyes of the law.
G. Plaintiff's Voluntary Exposure to Risk
PlaintifFs voluntary exposure to risk is the seventh and final ex-
planation put forth by Arkes and Schipani to explain why physicians
and corporate officers and directors are held to a different standard
of legal liability. But, like the other six explanations, this does not
seem all that persuasive. Arkes and Schipani observe that "unlike
many persons in need of medical care, shareholders have voluntarily
exposed themselves to risk by investing in a business enterprise."
211
They explain that at any point investors can easily and effortlessly
withdraw a particular investment and thereby eliminate their risk.212
Accordingly, a lower standard of care is seen as the appropriate stan-
dard to govern voluntary relationships such as corporation-share-
holder.213 Arkes and Schipani indicate on the other hand, that
"persons in need of medical care generally have not voluntarily ex-
posed themselves to a health risk" in the same sense that a purchaser
of securities assumes a risk of loss.
214
Although it is arguably true that there is much less of a voluntary
relationship between doctor and patient 215-especially in an age
211 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 629.
212 See id.
213 Although we add the caveat that this statement should be limited to publicly
traded corporations. The ability of shareholders to withdraw their investments is se-
verely restricted in non-publicly traded corporations (such as closely held corpora-
tions). Despite the absence of a market in which non-publicly traded shares can be
bought and sold, the business judgment rule still applies with equal vigor. For a dis-
cussion of the applicability of the business judgment rule in the setting of a closely
held corporation and certain circumstances where courts have deviated from the busi-
ness judgment rule in favor of the "strict fiduciary duty" rule and the "involuntary
dissolution" rule, see Davis, supra note 76, at 593-94.
214 See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 629.
215 Although this would seem to be the better view, it can be argued that patients
do voluntarily expose themselves to the treatment of a particular physician just as
shareholders voluntarily expose themselves to the decisionmaking of a particular
group of officers and directors. Just as shareholders dissatisfied with the former deci-
sions of officers and directors are free to withdraw from a corporation, patients who
learn of a physician's unfavorable legal and disciplinary history or second-rate delivery
of care (for instance, through word of mouth) are also free to leave such a physician
in exchange for what they consider to be a more suitable health care provider. Ac-
cording to this argument, with state medical boards facilitating public access to data
banks containing physicians' past legal and disciplinary predicaments, patients, like
shareholders, are able to decide whether they are willing to expose themselves to
certain risks at the hands of particular physicians or corporate officers and directors.
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where HMOs provide less and less freedom of choice for patients-
arguably too a voluntary relationship alone does not justify a lower
standard of care for either physicians or corporate officers and
directors.
Consider the views ofJudge Ralph Winter, surely one of the most
perceptive analysts of corporate law in or out of the judiciary. True,
Judge Winter has emphasized in one of his typically trenchant opin-
ions that investors by diversification can readily lessen their risk of any
given holding. They therefore would seem to need less protection by
the courts from the (by hindsight) unfortunate risks created for inves-
tors by corporate officers and directors compared to the (by hind-
sight) unfortunate risks created for patients by physicians. 216 But
Judge Winter goes on to emphasize two additional factors which jus-
tify the business judgment rule that would also seem to justify its (at
least partial) extension to physicians. First, the need "that the law not
create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions"217 that fear
of litigation can impart. Much has been made in this Article of the
same fear induced by litigation for physicians. 216  Second, Winter
enunciates reasoning previously discussed as also very often applicable
to physicians:
[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect
device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The circumstances
surrounding a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in a
courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for
quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information.
The entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and to confront
uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a
wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect
knowledge. 219
In other words, just as shareholders can research a particular corporation prior to
entering into a voluntary relationship with it, this argument contends that patients
seeking non-emergency medical attention, particularly one involving high-risk or in-
vasive procedures, likewise can supposedly research the adverse professional history of
a physician prior to coming under his/her care. Of course, under an HMO or PPO
system, patients may not have as much full freedom to select their health care provid-
ers as may be the case in a fee for service regime. But HMOs and PPOs do not com-
pletely eliminate patient choice; instead, they allow patients to select health care
providers from among a group of physicians contracted with and, often for an addi-
tional premium or deductible, even to go outside the approved panel. Therefore,
patient choice is restricted, but not eliminated.
216 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
217 Id. at 886.
218 See supra notes 102-09, 117-35 and accompanying text.
219 Joy, 692 F.2d at 886.
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The key to the business judgment rule, then, and consequently
the current difference in legal liability for physicians and corporate
officers and directors, by no means turns alone-or even necessarily
primarily-on the existence or non-existence of a readily available di-
versification of risk or any of the other distinguishing factors discussed
by Arkes and Schipani. We repeat that what is key is that courts lack
the expertise to routinely second-guess the business wisdom of corpo-
rate officers and directors, with all the attendant evils of their attempt-
ing to do so, especially the risks of error and overdeterrence. And the
point is that courts likewise lack the expertise to routinely second-
guess the medical decisions of physicians. This truism seems to us to
at least equal, and perhaps even dwarfs any talk of diversification, etc.,
along with any distinction between "deciding versus doing," a discus-
sion of which follows.
H. Deciding Versus Doing
Although Arkes and Schipani do not rely on the distinction be-
tween deciding and doing to explain why physicians and corporate
officers and directors are subject to different standards of liability,
some writers have attempted to rationalize this difference by such a
distinction. As one writer puts it, "[d]irectors do not 'do' things in
the same sense as doctors, lawyers, architects, or plumbers. Their du-
ties consist principally of overseeing management, establishing corpo-
rate policy, and weighing major business transactions."220 Others
have explained that "what directors do is engage, more or less contin-
uously, in a process of reading, thinking, discussing, inquiring, delib-
erating and, in the end, deciding."221 Although it may be true that
officers and directors are engaged over time in such tasks, is that dis-
tinction dispositive?
In the first place, like the corporate professional, physicians too
exercise discretion, weigh options, make decisions, and then ulti-
mately execute those decisions. In the process of carrying out their
duties, physicians likewise must read, think, discuss, inquire, and de-
liberate. For instance, a surgeon may decide that a patient is in need
of an operation. Before recommending surgery, a surgeon can be ex-
pected to routinely peruse medical literature, discuss options with col-
leagues, inquire into the medical history of patients, weigh such
various information, and consider alternative forms of treatment.
Granted that such "deciding" might be seen as separate from "doing,"
220 James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Lia-
bility Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207, 1232 (1988).
221 Balotti & Hanks, supra note 73, at 1343.
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i.e., executing the decision for example by actually conducting the
surgery. To that extent at least, logically, physicians ought be exempt
from liability only for "decisions." But focusing so exclusively on the
often somewhat tenuous distinction between deciding and doing222 to
carve up exposure to liability for physicians does not seem very prom-
ising, even assuming it works for corporate officers and directors. For
example, how about "decisions" in the course of unexpected contin-
gencies during surgery?
So which way is the more prudent course as to liability for physi-
cians-no immunity for either deciding or doing, or immunity for
both? Neither brings us to our proposed solution, embodying a vari-
ant of-and arguably an improvement on-the business judgment
rule at least as applied to medical malpractice cases. But before dis-
cussing our proposed solution, let us turn briefly to the recommenda-
tions of Arkes and Schipani.
L Recommendations by Arkes and Schipani
Even Arkes and Schipani, despite concluding, "there are legiti-
mate reasons why the standards of care in business and medicine
ought to differ," acknowledge that "to the extent the medical malprac-
tice situation subjects physicians to hindsight bias, procedural changes
should be made to minimize this judgment error. ' 223 Arkes and Schi-
pani then recommend three reforms: (1) the development of practice
guidelines; (2) the establishment of various arbitration boards; and
(3) the use of a bifurcated trial procedure. 224 Of the three reform
schemes, they endorse the bifurcated trial procedure as the most
promising and practical approach to curtail the effects of hindsight
bias.225 We have already addressed the various shortcomings of prac-
tice guidelines, 226 and Arkes and Schipani touch upon some of the
222 See supra note 49.
223 Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 630.
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text. The existence of practice
guidelines may actually breed litigation against hospitals. This may occur in four situ-
ations. First, hospitals may be held liable for negligently implementing substandard
guidelines. John D. Blum, Hospitals, New Medical Practice Guidelines, CQI and Potential
Liability Outcomes, 36 ST. Louis U. LJ. 913, 943 (1992). Second, hospitals may be
found liable for a physician's deviation from a guideline if the hospital neglected to
utilize the guideline to monitor the physician's course of treatment. Id. Third, hospi-
tals that create incentives and penalties that affect a physician's medical judgment
and decisionmaking autonomy may be held jointly or solely responsible for a patient's
injuries. Id. Lastly, a hospital may be held liable if its implementation of practice
guidelines leads to the reasonable belief that a physician is an agent of a hospital. See,
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drawbacks of arbitration boards, albeit briefly.2 27 Their recommenda-
tion of bifurcated trials seems similarly subject to challenge as a rem-
edy to existing problems of the tort system.
The use of bifurcated trials is already available in many states.
228
Federal courts also provide for its use under Rule 42 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.2 29 Bifurcated trials typically allow juries to
decide issues of duty of care violations only during the first stage of
trial.230 That is, the determination of liability is only permitted in the
first phase. It is only when physicians are held to have departed from
applicable standards of care that juries normally decide, during the
second stage, issues of damages.231 Arkes and Schipani reason that
"[b] ecause the issue of the physician's care is the only issue decided in
the first phase, the jury hears nothing of the patient's pain and suffer-
ing or other aspects of the unfortunate outcome. Ignorance of the
outcome would tend to minimize the effects of hindsight bias."2
32
Though this may be true, the use of bifurcated trials still requires the
determination of fault during the first phase of trial and then, if nec-
essary, an assessment of noneconomic losses during the second.
Therefore, the use of the bifurcated trial does not remedy the most
unfortunate symptoms of modem tort law; instead, it simply separates
the tort system's failings into two distinct and separate processes.
Merely dividing the tort system's two most crippling faults will not
solve the malfunctions affecting the tort system.
This brings us to our proposed solution, embodying a variant
of-and arguably an improvement on-the business judgment rule, at
least as applied to medical malpractice cases.
e.g., Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 286 (Wis. 1992) (dealing with a hospital held
liable under apparent authority for the negligence of a physician, who was an inde-
pendent contractor, because paper with hospital letter head was presented to the
patient).
227 See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 29, at 632-33.
228 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(4)
(West 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1) (1998); MONTr. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)
(1991); NEv. Rv. STAT. 42.005(3) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13 (West 1997);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-30 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(2) (1997); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. it. 23, § 9.1 (West 1998); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(A)
(Vernon 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (1996).
229 See Fed. R Civ. P. 42(b) and amendments (allowing courts to order a separate
trial of any claim or any separate issue in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice or when separate trials will lead to expedition and economy).
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IV. THE EARLY OFFER PLAN
Abraham Lincoln once said: "Discourage litigation. Persuade
your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them
how the nominal winner is often the real loser-in fees, expenses, and
waste of time. '2 3 3 In the same vein, Judge Learned Hand remarked: "I
must say that, as a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost
anything else short of sickness and death. '23 4 It is with these general
concepts in mind that the senior author of this Article has developed
an early offers plan. The goal of the early offers plan is to encourage
prompt settlement of personal injury tort claims, including those aris-
ing from medical malpractice. The early offer approach is not an ab-
solute no-fault rule. Under the early offer regime, the current tort
system is retained as an alternative to settlement, and payments are
not made automatically upon- the happening of a statutorily defined
injury, as is the case in workers' compensation and no-fault automo-
bile insurance.
235
Rather, under the plan, a defendant facing a personal injury
claim would have the option of offering the claimant, within a speci-
fied period (say, 120 days after a claim), periodic payments of the
claimant's net economic loss. Net economic loss under the plan
would mandate payment of medical expenses (including rehabilita-
tion) and lost wages not already covered by collateral sources. Also
payable would be reasonable attorney fees, which, however, would be
much less than the normal 30% or 40% contingency fee given the
quick resolution of cases. Crucial is that nothing for pain and suffer-
ing, or any other noneconomic loss would be due. Crucial too is that
to qualify as a statutory early offer nothing less then the foregoing can
be offered. Although acceptance of an early offer by a claimant would
end the dispute, in the event that an early offer made by a defendant
is rejected by a claimant in favor of litigation, the claimant would then
be required to establish a defendant's breach of a lower standard of
care (defined as wanton or intentional misconduct) by a higher bur-
den of proof (defined as clear and convincing evidence, or preferably
233 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture (1850), in THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SUPPLEMENT 1832-1865, at 18, 19 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1974).
234 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDcE 26, 146 (1994)
(quoting Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, Address
Before the New York City Bar Association (Nov. 17, 1921), in 3 LECTURES ON LEc ToPIcs:
1921-1922, at 87, 105 (1926)).
235 SeeJEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTrERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 181-82
(1979).
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beyond a reasonable doubt).236 Should a defendant choose not to
make an early offer, an injured victim would have recourse under nor-
mal common-law tort principles as to the standard of care, burden of
proof, and the extent of damages.
Under this approach, defendants will have a strong incentive to
settle many arguably meritorious claims, not merely those with a high
likelihood of a claimant's success at trial. Since the absence of an
early offer would often result in a claimant pursuing a personal injury
action under the existing tort system, defendants should welcome the
opportunity to settle claims early in the adjudication process. The
early resolution of these cases would allow defendants to avoid the
uncertainty of determining at trial both liability and noneconomic
damages while simultaneously greatly lessening attorney fees on both
sides, which represent the vast bulk of transaction costs. 237 Also, any
concerns of higher costs under the early offers regime should be
eased by the very fact that a defendant electing to tender an early
offer will do so because such a choice-all things considered-is eco-
nomically prudent.238 When a defendant is confronted with a mani-
festly unmeritorious claim, an early offer will not be made since the
defendant will rely on the current tort system to dispose of the claim
should it be pursued. Simply put, no defendants need to make an
offer if they would not do so in the absence of the early offers plan.
But this does not mean that claimants as a class are disadvantaged
overall by the early offers scheme. Although claimants who accept
early offers waive their rights to recover noneconomic losses such as
pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and punitive damages, they
correspondingly secure prompt payment of actual losses (to the ex-
tent collateral sources are insufficient), plus attorneys' fees, while si-
multaneously avoiding the uncertainty, delay,239 and high transaction
costs240 associated with a normal tort claim. Notice that because de-
236 See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 884.
237 Almost three-fifths (57%, as opposed to 47% for motor vehicle claims) of the
dollars spent by the health care system on malpractice litigation is expended on attor-
neys' fees and other transaction costs. Weiler, supra note 14, at 1163.
238 In deciding whether to tender an early offer, a defendant will consider the
following factors: the amount of net losses versus transaction costs plus monetary high
verdict exposure under traditional litigation.
239 Three years is the median period from the occurrence of the medical incident
to the malpractice payment. Weiler, supra note 14, at 1163.
240 See David S. Starr, The No-Fault Alternative to Medical Malpractice Litigation: Com-
pensation, Deterrence, and Viability Aspects of a Patient Compensation Scheme, 20 TEx. TECH
L. REv. 803, 806-07 n.23 (1989) (observing that delay tactics, contingent fees, and
psychological stress all contribute to significant transaction costs, even for successful
litigants); see also Murray L. Schwartz & DanielJ.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the
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fendants must still pay claimants' net economic losses, which has the
effect of internalizing substantial costs of accidents for defendants,
disincentives for defendants to act negligently are addressed. There-
fore, unlike the business judgment rule, which more often than not
completely immunizes corporate officers and directors from all dam-
ages for violations of duty of care, the early offers regime requires a
defendant to make a claimant economically whole, thereby avoiding
false negatives, before the variant of the business judgment rule at-
taches in the form of relief from full-blown tort liability through avoid-
ance of noneconomic damages. Only then is such full-blown
protection for defendants granted, assuming a claimant accepts the
early offer. And a claimant who rejects an early offer still has the op-
portunity to hold a defendant liable for both economic and
noneconomic damages, although admittedly the process of doing so is
considerably more onerous. (Note, an early offers bill would allow all
other potentially liable parties to join or be joined in the early offer,
with any ultimate shares of paying claims decided by arbitration
among all the offerors.)
We reach here an issue of real bite: because personal injury
claims-unlike all other damage claims-routinely entail damages for
both economic and noneconomic loss, it becomes uniquely feasible to
allow defendants ex ante to not only make, but enforce, a socially at-
tractive settlement; this involves claimant's acceptance of defendant's
prompt offer of payment of economic damages in return for waiver of
noneconomic damages, with statutory sanctions of a lower standard of
care proven with a higher burden of proof if the offer is refused. This
means that pursuit of a common-law claim for full damages is allowed
only with a higher burden of proof of a lower standard of care. Obvi-
ously, in non-personal injury claims, where only economic damages
are at 9take, no similarly equitable means are available to sanction a
claimant who refuses to accept an offer of only a portion of total dam-
ages claimed.
As emphasized throughout this Article, the fault criterion of ordi-
nary negligence is an unsound basis to predicate liability, and ulti-
mately serves as one of the two major shortcomings of the existing tort
system.241 Because such fault is ill-suited for purposes of administer-
ing liability, verdicts, for example, can be grounded in sympathy for
Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1970) (stating
that the greatest single cost for a claimant is the contingent fee).
241 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff, not the substandard conduct of the defendant.242 Under
protection similar to the business judgment rule243-which we em-
phasize is basically what the early offers regime achieves-triers of fact
would not be called on to toil through mountains of technical, confus-
ing, and often contradictory evidence in order that liability for ordi-
nary negligence be imposed. Like the business judgment rule, the
early offers approach is predicated on the belief that courts are nor-
mally ill-suited to second-guess the expertise and acumen of highly
skilled professionals. As second-guessing in the business context ham-
pers, not advances, the delivery of goods and services by corporate
America, so too second-guessing in the medical context often hinders,
not furthers, the delivery of quality medical care. 244 Essentially, the
early offers approach provides that absent the equivalent of bad faith
in the decisionmaking process or in the execution of the decision, a
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the defendant once
an early offer has been tendered. Wanton misconduct thus can be
seen as the equivalent of bad faith under the business judgment rule,
with both being relatively rare and difficult to prove.
245
The existence of a lower standard of care once an early offer has
been rejected would allow triers of fact ex post to recognize the ready
distinction between conduct within the arguable ambits of due care
and wantonness should a claim withstand a pretrial motion to dismiss
and reach trial stage. To illustrate, as the following table shows, on a
scale of one to ten, it is difficult to tell the difference between, say, 4
and 5 or between 8 and 9, but not so for the difference between 4 and
9.
/
Due care Negligence Wanton
1-4 5-8 9-10
Similarly, this mathematical progression allows potential defend-
ants ex ante a better signal for what misconduct full-scale liability will
be assessed. Potential defendants would seek to avoid conduct ap-
proaching the mid-range of numbers for fear that conduct that might
be measured at, say, 7 or 8, could be construed as 9. Thus, the availa-
242 SeeJeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guar-
antees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REv. 898, 900 (1985); see also Troyen A.
Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-
Malpractice Litigation, 335 NE- ENG.J. MED. 1963, 1966 (1996) (indicating that a plain-
tiffs degree of disability, not a defendant's negligence, is most statistically correlated
with tort recovery).
243 Under the business judgment rule, quality of care is typically measured by con-
cepts of bad faith or a lower standard of care.
244 See supra notes 102-09, 117-23 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 57-62, 66-68 and accompanying text.
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bility of damages for pain and suffering (not to speak of punitive dam-
ages) should have the effect of deterring potential defendants from
even flirting with negligent conduct that could potentially be labeled
as wanton.
246
The ability to thus discriminate between extremes will make the
imposition of full-scale liability for physicians less vagarious and ran-
dom, greatly lessening the often counterproductive (even pernicious)
effects of fortuitous litigation that now loom over medical care. Even
if determinations of wanton misconduct and noneconomic damages
would still on occasion have to be assessed,247 the need to perform
such inquires would be greatly reduced since relatively few defendants
can be expected to breach the lower due care standard of the early
offers regime.248 The efficacy of the lower standard of care (i.e., wan-
ton misconduct) is reinforced by the need to prove it by a higher bur-
den of proof (i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt). These "twin peaks," it
will be noted, mirror criminal standards designed to avoid false posi-
tives. But that protection for a claimant is buttressed by the require-
ment that a defendant only avoid false positives by also avoiding false
negatives (unlike under criminal law or the business judgment rule)
by offering promptly to pay a claimant's net economic losses. In that
connection, to further avoid fears that payment of only net economic
losses may be derisory for those already relatively completely covered
for their economic losses by collateral sources, e.g., pensioners or
homemakers with adequate health care coverage and no wage loss,
the early offers bill could provide that seriously injured claimants, as
rigorously defined under the statute, must be offered a choice be-
tween payment of net economic losses or a lump sum of, say,
$500,000.
246 See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 879-80.
247 Damages awarded after the imposition of liability has been determined (for a
breach of a lower standard of care) would be expected to be great-even higher than
damages that are currently awarded for tortious duty of care violations. The ability of
claimants to overcome the hurdles imposed by the early offers regime would likely be
viewed as a sign of greater culpability on the part of defendants. Triers of fact may
then deem it appropriate, and rightfully so, to award punitive damages for the plain-
tiff. The possibility of such exorbitant damages, albeit slim, serves as a powerful deter-
rent against suboptimal physician conduct. As it already stands, the average medical
malpractice award, adjusted for the severity of a victim's injury, is twice as high as
product liability cases and three times as high as motor vehicle cases. See Weiler,
supra note 14, at 1174 (citing Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malprac-
tice and Otwr Personal Injuries Created Equal', LAW & CorrEMp. PROBS., Winter 1991, at
5, 16-21).
248 For a more detailed explanation concerning the functioning of pain and suf-
fering at the punitive level, see O'Connell, supra note 24, at 886-89.
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Note, too, that the combination of proof of a lower standard of
care by a higher standard of proof will also mean that through such
stringent criteria, judges will be in a very strong position to control
any jury aberrations by summary judgments, directed verdicts, orjudg-
ments n.o.v. Note further too that these exacting standards will also
make it harder for claimants to retain responsible (and therefore
more credible) expert witnesses willing to characterize a defendant's
misconduct as so irresponsible as to justify being labeled egregious.
And even if induced to do so, it will be harder for any expert so testify-
ing to withstand cross-examination.
Although this Article has focused on medical malpractice claims
against physicians, its theory that the thrust of the business judgment
rule be adapted to health care claims need not be thus limited. In-
deed, given increasing recognition that medical misadventures stem
from complex, interactive, systemic factors involving the entire health
care community-by no means limited to physicians-the early offers
regime should arguably be extended to the entire universe of health
care providers. Otherwise, plaintiffs' attorneys, foreclosed from full-
blown claims against physicians, will be straining to claim against
health care providers other than physicians. Indeed, funds from early
offers by physicians would be used to finance litigation against such
non-physician providers. Thus, a statutory proposal to apply early of-
fers to federally funded health care (such as Medicaid and Medicare)
defined health care providers to include hospitals (psychiatric and
otherwise), skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, rural
health clinics, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities, hos-
pice programs, doctors of medicine or osteopathy, doctors of dental
surgery or dental medicine, doctors of podiatric medicine, doctors of
optometry, and chiropractors.
249
Furthermore, as stated above, product liability claims mirror
medical malpractice cases in their complexity and consequent de-
mands for expert witnesses.250 Thus, the early offers approach simi-
larly could be applied to product liability, thereby also avoiding courts
routinely being forced to play the role of "appellate engineers."25 1 In-
deed, a more recent federal bill sponsored by Senator Mitch McCon-
nell (R., Ky) authorizes early offers to almost all personal injury cases
most of which, after all, are "unbounded.1252 (Auto accident claims
249 See 131 CONG. RFc. 17,775 (1985) (utilizing the definitions of 42 U.S.C. § 1395
(1984)).
250 See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
251 See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 953 (3d Cir. 1980).
252 S. 1861, 104th Cong. (1996).
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against motorists are excluded from the bill on the grounds that they
are better dealt with by genuinely effective no-fault auto legisla-
tion.) 253 On the other hand, the earlier federal early offers bill spon-
sored by Rep. Richard Gephardt (D., Mo.) limited itself, as indicated
above, to medical malpractice claims arising only from federally
funded health care, and a bill sponsored in Massachusetts by then
Governor Michael Dukakis limited itself to claims arising from general
surgery.254 A further use could apply the early offers approach to the
currently raging political dispute over the right of patients to sue their
HMO (often prevented under applicable federal law). Under such a
compromise, any right to sue the HMO would be subject to the right
of the HMO to make the binding early offer described above. Better
than simply expanding the notoriously adverse effects of allowing
more malpractice claims or, at the other end of the spectrum, simply
preventing malpractice claims against HMOs as under present law, ap-
plying the early offers regime to HMOs can be seen as a responsible
compromise. 255 Thus, an early offers bill can be either narrow or
broad in its scope.
CONCLUSION
Though many explanations have been put forth to help unravel
why a different standard of liability exists for physicians and corporate
officers and directors, ultimately these justifications either prove too
much or too little. Much of the reasoning that supports the existence
of the business judgment rule likewise applies to health care and
other enterprises. The real difference can be found in the effect that
the dissimilar rules have had on two activities. Overall, physicians
have functioned under a cloud of fear and have understandably taken
measures to reduce their exposure to liability-oftentimes by unnec-
essarily increasing costs for the entire health care system. Conversely,
corporate officers and directors have had the relative peace of mind
that accompanies professional independence and judicial deference
to decisionmaking. And, given the astonishing commercial success of
the American corporation throughout the years-and especially re-
cently, at least pre-September 11, 2001-can it be convincingly main-
tained that the American economy has suffered from thus freeing
253 H.R. 3084, 99th Cong. (1985).
254 Mass. House Bill no. 5700 (May 1986).
255 For a proposal that early offers be used for claims against HMOs as a compro-
mise to their full scale liability versus complete immunity, see Jeffrey O'Connell &
James F. Neale, HMO's, Cost Containment and Early Offers: New Malpractice Threats and a
Proposed Reform, 14J. CoNTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 287, 310-13 (1998).
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corporations under the business judgment rule from the lash of
litigation?
The early offers approach seeks to provide some much-needed
protection from the frustrations of litigation for physicians and other
professionals as well as for injured parties. Through the use of a lower
standard of care and a higher burden of proof once an early offer has
been tendered, it would be expected that the early offers regime
would achieve results similar to the business judgment rule. But, un-
like the business judgment rule, the added protection afforded to de-
fendants by the early offers plan is not triggered until a defendant has
agreed to provide economic redress. Therefore, the early offers plan
does not simply immunize a defendant from liability; rather, it makes
the imposition of fuller liability much more difficult only after lesser
liability for essential economic losses has been assumed.
The time is ripe for changes in the resolution of medic-al malprac-
tice litigation. The early offers plan imparts hope for much improve-
ment in the adjudication of these cases (and others)25 6 bottomed as it
is in the time-tested wisdom of the business judgment rule.
256 See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
TooLs OF THE EARLY," OFFERS PLAN
A. Lower Standard of Care
Articulated in legal terminology, the word "wanton" is character-
ized by extreme recklessness or foolhardiness. 257 In its ordinary ac-
cepted sense, it connotes "perverseness exhibited by deliberate and
uncalled for conduct, recklessness, disregardful of rights and an un-
justifiable course of action. ' 258 Wanton conduct is defined as an:
[a] ct or failure to act, when there is a duty to act, in reckless disre-
gard of rights of another, coupled with a consciousness that injury is
a probable consequence of act or omission. Term refers to inten-
tional act of unreasonable character performed in disregard of risk
known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been
aware of it and so great as to make it highly probable that harm
would follow and it is usually accomplished by conscious indiffer-
ence to the consequences.
259
Compare the definition of negligence:
The failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful
person would use under similar circumstances; it is the doing of
some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done
under similar circumstances or failure to do what a person of ordi-
nary prudence would have done under similar circumstances ....
[Also], the term refers only to that legal delinquency which results
whenever a man fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit,
whether it be slight, ordinary, or great. It is characterized chiefly by
inadvertence, thoughtlessness, inattention, and the like, while "wantonness"
or "recklessness" is characterized by willfulness.260
To a legally trained mind, the definitions of wanton conduct and
negligence embody highly different criteria of liability. Obviously,
simple negligence is inherently easier to establish because it measures
the defendant's careless conduct against the objective standard of the
reasonably prudent person. On the other hand, wanton conduct en-
tails more than just carelessness, but heinous conduct-a relatively
subjective criterion.
Though perhaps jurors will be unable to precisely articulate the
difference between wantonness and negligence, essentially, for many
jurors, the difference boils down to a distinction between perversity
257 BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 1582 (6th ed. 1990).
258 Botto v. Fischesser, 189 N.E.2d 127, 130 (Ohio 1963).
259 BLACK's LAW DICrONARY, supra note 257, at 1582.
260 Id. at 1032 (emphasis added).
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and carelessness. Jurors can readily draw on past personal exper-
iences to accentuate the bright-line that exists between these two stan-
dards of care. For jurors, the question will simply be, "Was the
defendant's conduct perverse or was itjust careless?"-with a manifest
difference between the two. Therefore, holding physicians to a lower
standard of care under the early offers regime when offers are re-
jected should help eliminate the arbitrary and erratic nature under
which determinations of liability are made and consequently make the
imposition of liability more consistent and fair. This is especially so if
the wanton conduct must be proven by a higher burden of proof such
as beyond a reasonable doubt.2 6 1 And it is to the latter standard we
now turn.
B. Higher Burden of Proof
The second tool of the early offers plan is the requirement that a
claimant prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a tortfeasor engaged
in wanton or intentional misconduct. 262 The question thus remains
whether jurors will be able to discriminate between the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard of proof under the current tort system
and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof recommended
by the early offers approach, just as they should be able to distinguish
between negligence and wanton misconduct. Will jurors be able to
draw the distinction between these two standards of proof, thereby
making the early offers approach an effective vehicle for the substan-
tial reduction of false positives (while also greatly reducing false nega-
tives through a corollary payment of net economic losses)?
The heightened standard of proof utilized by the early offers ap-
proach is, of course, modeled after that of the criminal justice system
(as is the highly anti-social element in wanton misconduct).263 The
261 See infra text accompanying notes 292-99.
262 This Article focuses mainly on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of
proof as opposed to one calling for "clear and convincing evidence." Because "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" embodies the highest standard of proof available in the
American legal system, it seems more appropriate to allow the triers of fact to distin-
guish between the lowest standard of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, and
by the highest standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt. But see infra notes
293-300 and accompanying text.
263 The first thing to note is that civil and criminal actions involve highly different
stakes. After execution, incarceration represents the ultimate consequence of convic-
tion under the criminal justice system. The substantive and procedural safeguards
instituted by the criminal adjudication process are in effect designed to prevent a
great outrage-an innocent person being temporarily or permanently deprived of
freedom through a false positive. In contrast, the consequences of tort liability are
wholly monetary or equitable in nature. Therefore, some critics may object to civil
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criminal system demands each juror to presume the innocence of an
accused until guilt is established by the beyond a reasonable doubt
test. The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
Constitution, is a basic element of a fair trial under our criminal jus-
tice system.264 The presumption of innocence places the burden of
proof on the state, while the reasonable doubt standard represents the
level of proof required to satisfy the burden.265 This tandem of stan-
dards of presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt results in a criminal trial not only asking whether a defendant is
guilty, but rather, whether a defendant is certainly guilty.2 6 6 Though at
first glance this may seem easy enough, the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard can be ticklish: The reasonable doubt standard re-
quires jurors to apply an "appropriate level of skepticism."267 Skepti-
cism is uncertainty-"the refusal to believe insufficiently proven facts
or conclusions. ' 268 Basically, skepticism is doubt. But if defining rea-
sonable doubt is elementary, defining what makes a particular doubt
reasonable is much more troublesome. 269 This is especially true be-
cause the brink of reasonable doubt is by definition the brink of un-
reasonable doubt.2 70 More precisely, reasonable doubt is defined as
that, "doubt based on reason and arising from evidence or lack of
evidence, and it is doubt which a reasonable man or woman might
and criminal standards of proof being equalized. Such critics may argue that the
relative importance that society places on the consequences of civil and criminal ver-
dicts reflect how certain ajury must be before it can sanction a civil or criminal defen-
dant under the respective systems. On the other hand, tools available in one system
should arguably be used to remedy serious problems existing in the other. Unless
conclusive empirical evidence suggests that there are serious adverse consequences
involved in uniformity of proof for both criminal and civil proceedings (such as the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard becoming weakened, thereby resulting in the
use of less skepticism by jurors), there is little reason why a standard of proof that has
worked well in one system should not be utilized in the other, especially with the
safeguards of the early offers proposal. See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 871. But see
infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
264 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
265 Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocenc4 40 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989).
266 Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Reasonable Certainty and Reasonable Doubt, 81 MARQ. L.
REV. 655, 658 (1998).
267 Id. at 656.
268 Id. at 666.
269 See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 18 (1994) (upholding a jury instruction
defining reasonable doubt as "such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent
person, in one of the graver and more important transactions of life, to pause and
hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon").
270 See Chambers, supra note 266, at 670.
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entertain, and it is not fanciful doubt, is not imagined doubt, and is
not doubt that juror might conjure up to avoid performing unpleas-
ant task or duty."271 Reasonable doubt does not require ajuror to be
absolutely or mathematically certain of a defendant's guilt.2 7 2 Such
levels of proof are only attainable through strict logical proof that are
impossible to mimic in an adjudication process because of the fallible
nature of trial evidence.2 73 Any fact-finding system that operates
under a requirement of absolute certainty would call for jurors to "be-
lieve that absolutely no possibility of innocence existed. '274 Needless
to say, a system imposing such a huge burden would be highly ineffi-
cient and would make convictions nearly impossible.
Practical or moral certainty,275 however, represents the maximal
level of certainty that ajuror can have when absolute certainty is lack-
ing.2 76 It has been equated with proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
27 7
Reasonable doubt "is not mere possible doubt; because everything re-
lating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt."278 Jurors who exonerate a defen-
dant just because they believe that there may exist unpresented evi-
dence that might plausibly explain the defendant's actions would have
mistakenly substituted unreasonable doubt for the reasonable doubt
standard.2 79 Although the difference between reasonable doubt and
unreasonable doubt can be thus asserted, admittedly whether a partic-
ular doubt is reasonable or unreasonable may be very difficult to re-
solve with certainty in the course of a jury's fact-finding inquiry.
A simple test can direct jurors to acquit a defendant if they are
able to construct a reasonable scenario, using all the evidence
271 BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY, supra note 257, at 1265.
272 See Chambers, supra note 266, at 660.
273 See id.
274 Id.
275 For the purposes of this Article, the slight difference that some find between
practical and moral certainty is inconsequential. For explanations of both practical
certainty and moral certainty see id. at 662 n.29 (citing BARBARAJ. SHAPIRO, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 1-41 (1991); Peter Tillers, Intellectual His-
toy, Probability and the Law of Evidence, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1465 (1993) (reviewing Sha-
piro's book Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause); Steven L. Smith, Skepticism,
Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 651 (1987)).
276 Id. at 662-63.
277 Id. at 663. For an extensive theoretical discussion and breakdown of reasona-
ble doubt, with an examination of subjective and objective reasonable doubt see id. at
687-97.
278 Id. at 669 n.61 (quoting Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development
of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REv. 507, 511 (1975)).
279 Id. at 670.
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presented, suggesting the innocence of a defendant.280 Such a test
would be in accord with the practical certainty standard of reasonable
doubt, for it assures that a juror is as certain as feasible of the defen-
dant's guilt before voting to convict. Further, such a test focuses on
the process rather than on the verdict.281 It provides a mere descrip-
tion as to how to remove reasonable doubt rather than stating an iron-
clad test as to what could or could not be reasonable doubt.
Essentially, this test forces jurors to entertain whether it is reasonably
plausible that the accused did not commit the wrong. The focus
therefore shifts from the reasonable possibility of guilt to the reasona-
ble possibility of innocence. In short, doubt becomes reasonable
doubt when a juror can "construct a reasonable scenario, consistent
with the evidence, under which a defendant is innocent ... because
that reasonable scenario may reflect truth. '2
82
Conceptually, there are three positions that a juror can have con-
cerning the guilt of an accused. A juror can be certain of a defen-
dant's innocence, uncertain of a defendant's guilt or innocence, or
certain of a defendant's guilt.2 3 Certainty and belief are not synony-
mous. Oftentimes, the line drawn by jurors between guilt and inno-
cence (certainty), and between belief and disbelief are not
superimposed upon one another.2 84 For instance, for our present
purposes, ajuror may believe that a defendant was wanton, yet be un-
certain as to whether this is so. Although evidence may support such a
belief, and the belief may ultimately be true, mere belief does not
constitute evidence satisfactory to arrive at practical certainty.
28 5
Since reasonable doubt is based on uncertainty, a correct application
of the reasonable doubt standard would require that the accused be
absolved.
On the other hand, the preponderance of the evidence or "more
likely than not" standard of proof means that the evidence presented
is of "greater weight or [is] more convincing than the evidence which
is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows
that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. '286 The
term preponderance in this context does not mean a greater quantity
280 Id. at 682.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 684.
283 See id. at 663.
284 See id.
285 See id. at 664.
286 BLACK's LAW DicriONARY, supra note 257, at 1182 (citing Braud v. Kinchen, 310
So. 2d 657, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1975)).
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of evidence; instead, it refers to the probative force of the evidence.2 87
Unlike the reasonable doubt standard, the preponderance of evi-
dence standard of proof does not require the erasure of all reasonably
lingering doubts in the minds of jurors before liability becomes
proper within the confines of the tort system. Rather, it requires ju-
rors not to find liability unless the weight of the evidence supporting
liability-taken as a whole-outweighs the other side favoring nonlia-
bility. Figuratively, the standard requires attorneys on both sides to
place evidence on a scale ofjustice288 that initially tilts in favor of the
defendant.28 9 At the conclusion of trial, after all proper evidence has
been placed on the arms ofjustice, the scale typically will tip in favor
of one outcome over another. Normally, both arms ofjustice will bear
weight suggesting that a tortfeasor could or could not be held lia-
ble.290 However, in the eyes of the law, the preponderance of evi-
dence standard of proof demands that the side with the superior
evidence be held victorious. Essentially, this standard of proof re-
quires a claimant to present enough evidence to cause the arms of
justice to move from the side supporting the tortfeasor beyond the
point of equipoise29 1 to the side favoring the claimant.
The difference lies in the fact that the preponderance of evi-
dence standard is a lesser-included standard within the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard of proof. Once jurors have been satisfied by
287 SeeFLEM1NGJAMES,JR. ET AL., CML PROCEDURE § 7.14, at 339-40 (4th ed. 1992).
288 This scale tips according to the superiority, not the quantity, of evidence.
289 The scale initially favors the defendant because normally it is the plaintiff who
bears the burden of proof. That is, the plaintiff must supply evidence to satisfy the
burdens of production and persuasion. In many regards the plaintiff's burden of
proof can be viewed as a "presumption of innocence" of the defendant. Therefore,
the defendant need not present any evidence since failure on the part of plaintiffs to
satisfy their burden should result in nonliability. But see Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478
P.2d 465, 473-77 (Cal. 1970) (utilizing a burden-shifting device requiring the defen-
dant to prove that even if a sign was placed at the pool, more probably than not the
plaintiffs would have drowned anyway).
290 This is because normally the case would not have gone to trial if both sides did
not have admissible evidence to persuade the triers to find in their favor. Even if a
tortfeasor does not introduce evidence at trial supporting his/her exoneration, recall
that the arms of justice initially were tilted in favor of the defendant because of the
burden of proof the plaintiff carries.
291 Equipoise is not sufficient because if all evidence has been presented and the
arms ofjustice rest in balance, then the claimant has not satisfied his/her burden of
proof. The claimant has not shown that more probably than not (51% or greater) the
accused tortfeasor committed the acts (or should have acted if he had a duty) and
must therefore be held liable. When the scale ofjustice is in equilibrium that suggests
that the tortfeasor conceivably could be, but does not support a finding that the
tortfeasor is more probably than not, liable.
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the latter standard, by definition, they have been satisfied by the for-
mer. The reverse is not true. Just because jurors satisfy themselves by
the preponderance of evidence standard of proof does not mean that
they have satisfied themselves by the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard. The preponderance of evidence standard permits jurors to
have reasonable doubts concerning the accountability of a defendant
while still holding a defendant liable. The preponderance of the evi-
dence standard of proof asks is the defendant probablyf9 2 guilty, not is
the defendant very clearly guilty.
Under preponderance of evidence, then, much less is required of
plaintiffs (and conversely, much more of the defense) in the quality of
lawyering, the quality of expert testimony, and the overall quality of
evidence. Certainly, the possibility of there being a false positive in-
creases since the mere existence of evidence which creates doubt as to
the guilt of defendants is not sufficient to allow them to avoid liability.
But note again, if, as a corollary of early offers, the possibility of false
positives is much less under a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt,
the possibility of false negatives has itself been negated by the prereq-
uisite that a defendant must offer to make the claimant economically
whole before invoking a rule that lessens the likelihood of a false
positive.
How clear in practice is the difference between the preponder-
ance of evidence standard and beyond a reasonable doubt? In a study
by sociologist Rita Simon, an authority on the jury, a sample ofjudges
and actual jurors were asked to quantify on a scale of 1 to 10 their
understanding of (1) beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) preponder-
ance of the evidence. 293 Judges quantified "beyond a reasonable
doubt" as equaling an 8.9 probability on the 1 to 10 scale;jurors quan-
tified it at 8.6, indicating that judges and jurors see the criminal bur-
den of proof very similarly.294 But as to "by a preponderance of the
evidence" judges quantified this at 5.5 probability, whereas jurors
quantified it at 7.5.295 In the words of the study, "Thus for ... lay
groups, the difference between criminal.., and civil.., standards are
much less than they are for the judges. The judges make a much
sharper distinction between the criminal and civil standards. '296 For
the judges, a preponderance means a little more than half, for the
292 "Probably" means 51% or greater.
293 Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the
Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 319, 324-25 (1971).
294 Id. at 325.
295 Id.
296 Id.; see also Jeffrey O'Connell, Juiy Trials in Civil Cases, 58 ILL. B.J. 796, 807-08
(1970).
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jurors it means a probability almost indistinguishable from the stan-
dard of criminal trials. The Simon study also purported to show that
how one quantifies a burden of proof does influence one's verdict.
297
The Simon study at least draws into question, then, how much
difference the heightened burden of proof may make in jury trials.
On the other hand, not only is the study dated, but, because it was
based on such a relatively small sample ofjurors, the study itself cau-
tioned that "further work needs to be done" on the possible discrep-
ancy between judge and jury understanding on burdens of proof.
2 98
In this connection, the much more ambitious Chicago jury study--on
which Professor Simon worked and which is also dated-found strik-
ing consonance between judge and jury verdicts as to liability in civil
cases.299 A much more recent jury study by Duke Law Professor Neil
Vidmar also purports to confirm the reliability ofjury verdicts in medi-
cal malpractice cases. 00
In sum, we hypothesize that for our present purposes, because
what is being tested by the heightened burden of proof when an offer
to pay a claimant's out-of-pocket losses is rejected is the perverse con-
duct of wanton behavior, few jury false positives with their hindsight
bias need be feared. Indeed, the criterion of beyond a reasonable
doubt is, in our view, sufficiently strong that one can hypothesize that
it could be effectively combined under an early offers regime with the
lesser standard of conduct of gross negligence as opposed to wanton
misconduct. Gross negligence is defined as "[t] hat entire want of care
which would raise [the] belief that [the] act or omission complained
297 See O'Connell, supra note 296, at 808.
298 Id.
299 See Harry Kalven, Jr., Juries in Personal Injuy Cases: Their Functions and Methods,
in TRAuMA AND THE AUrOMOBILE 335, 343 (William Curran & Neil Chayet eds., 1966).
It should be pointed out, though, that the findings of Kalven and Zeisel on the agree-
ment between judge and jury are undermined as based on questionable statistical
data as Kalven and Zeisel cautiously concede. See HARRY KALvN & HANs ZEISEL, THE
AMERICANJURY 33-34 (1966); see also Michael H. Walsh, The American Jury: A Reassess-
ment, 79 YALE LJ. 142 (1969) (reviewing the Chicago Jury Project, documented by
Kalven & Zeisel in The American Jury).
300 See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 265-77
(1995). But see Thecdore Eisenberg, Judicial Decisionmaking in Federal Products Liability
Cases, 1978-1997, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 323, 333 (1999) (assessingjudicial performance
in products liability cases and concluding that awards in judge-tried cases exceed
those in jury-tried cases); O'Connell & Pohl, supra note 7, at 368-79. For another
comparison of tort cases generally, see BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S.
DEPt. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDIcrS IN LARGE COUNTIES 1976
(NGr-173426 1999), reported in Edward Walsh, Plaintiffs'Edge: Trial by Judge, but Juries
More Generous with Damage Awards, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1999, at AO.
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of was [the] result of conscious indifference to [the] rights and wel-
fare of persons affected by it."
'
301
Admittedly, the cases are replete with confusion as to the differ-
ence between various lower standards of care beyond simple negli-
gence, i.e., gross negligence, recklessness, wantonness, and
willfulness. 30 2 If, however, buttressed by a higher burden of proof,
any such criterion probably can be effective. Indeed, we go so far as
to suggest that if politically desired, a gross negligence standard of
conduct could even be combined in an early offers regime with a clear
and convincing evidence standard of burden of proof. Even if, for
whatever reason, these less clear-cut standards provide insufficient im-
munity to full-scale liability for common-law damages, keep in mind
there is the ultimate safeguard that early offers need simply not be
made.
A final note: A further ready means of defining the backup crite-
ria for both standard of care and burden of proof when early offers
are rejected-and one which incorporates any jurisdiction's own long
accepted terminology as to both-would simply provide that when an
early offer is rejected, no claimant can recover unless he or she estab-
lishes a case justifying punitive damages under current state law. If
the criterion for punitive damages is deemed too porous, as many
contend,30 3 some jurisdictions have moved to tighten the require-
ments therefor by, for example, requiring a conscious disregard for
the safety of others30 4 provable beyond a reasonable doubt 30 5 or by
clear and convincing evidence.306 And even without such provisions,
punitive damages, contrary to mythology, are said to be relatively rare
in cases of personal injury compared to commercial disputes.
30 7
301 BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 257, at 1033-34 (citing Claunch v. Ben-
nett, 395 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)).
302 E.g., Hering v. Hilton, 147 N.E.2d 311, 313-14 (Ill. 1958); Srajer v. Schwartz-
man, 188 P.2d 971, 975-76 (Kan. 1948); Elliott v. Peters, 185 P.2d 139, 142-43 (Kan.
1947); Helleren v. Dixon, 86 N.E.2d 777, 780 (Ohio 1949).
303 See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 24, at 889 n.82.
304 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-121-102(1)(b) (West 1999).
305 See, e.g., id. § 13-25-127(2).
306 See MINN. STAT. § 549.20.1(a) (Supp. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor
Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 111 (Mo. 1996) (overruling a case that rejected a higher stan-
dard of proof).
307 See E. MOLLER ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN FINANCIAL INJURYJURY VERDICTS, at
xiii (1997) (noting that financial injury disputes account for almost half of the puni-
tive awards, which are awarded in less than four percent of all verdicts).
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